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WITHHOLDING CONSENT TO ASSIGNMENT:
THE CHANGING RIGHTS OF THE
COMMERCIAL LANDLORD
Murray S. Levin*
Interpretation of assignment approval clauses in commercial
leases has become uncertain following publication of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Property because the Restatement has adopted a
minority position that under such a clause assignment may not be
unreasonably withheld. Professor Levin criticizes this rule as an
inappropriate change in landlord-tenant law that overturns a
widely accepted and well established rule without compelling
reason or substantial support in the case law. Special attention is
directed to the distinction between the issues surrounding lease
assignment and a landlord's duty to mitigate damages, issues which
have commonly been confused by courts and commentators alike.
A well established rule of landlord-tenant law is that absent either a statu-
tory restriction or a restriction fixed by the parties themselves, a tenant may
freely assignI a lease without the landlord's consent.' This rule contem-
plates that a lease provision restricting or prohibiting assignment will be
given effect. 3 Of course, such a provision may be variously worded. The
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Kansas; M.B.A., University of Wis-
consin; J.D., University of Kansas.
1. For the purposes of this Article, the word "assign" and its derivatives may be consid.
ered synonymous with all transfers of an interest in the lease or leasehold estate. Note, how-
ever, that in practice assignments, subleases, licenses, mortgages, hypothecations, and other
such voluntary or involuntary transfers are all accorded separate regard because these terms,
often used to effect restraints on alienation, are narrowly construed. A covenant against one
form of alienation does not preclude another form. E.g., Ser-Bye Corp. v. C.P. & G. Markets,
Inc., 78 Cal. App. 2d 915, 179 P.2d 342 (1947) (sale of controlling stock of lessee corporation
not prohibited by restriction on assignment and subletting); Liberty Nat'l Bank v. Pollack, 337
I11. App. 385, 85 N.E.2d 855 (1st Dist. 1949) (change in personnel of lessee partnership not
prevented by lease provision against assignment without consent of lessor); DeBaca v. Fidel, 61
N.M. 181, 297 P.2d 322 (1956) (provision forbidding an assignment not violated by a subletting);
Dunlap v. Mulry, 85 A.D. 498, 83 N.Y.S. 477 (1903) (mortgage not precluded by lease cove-
nant prohibiting assignment). For a discussion of the Illinois law of assignment and subletting,
see Morris, Assignment and Subletting, 46 CH. B. REC. 140 (1964).
2. See 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.56 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 2 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 246f1], at 372.85 (1977); 3A G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1205 (repl. 1959) [hereinafter cited as THOMPSON]. Statutes
forbidding transfer by the lessee without the lessor's assent are found in only a few states, for
example, Missouri and Texas. See C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 74
n.3 (1962). Courts have occasionally held that the interest of the lessee was non-transferable
(even in the absence of a statutory provision or an expressed restriction in the lease) when the
lessor relied upon the personal characteristics or business efficiency of the lessee and when the
rent was fixed at a percentage of profits or sales. See, e.g., Nassau Hotel Co. v. Barnett & Barse
Corp., 162 A.D. 381, 147 N.Y.S. 283, affd, 212 N.Y. 568, 106 N.E. 1036 (1914).
3. A tenant's breach of a lease provision that restricts or prohibits assignment does not
terminate the lease. Karbelnig v. Brothwell, 244 Cal. App. 2d 333, 53 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1966);
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restriction could be written in an absolute form, such as "[ijessee shall not
sell or assign this lease or sublet the demised premises or any part thereof"4
or "[if lessee shall assign ... the lease shall thereupon terminate."'  Yet,
more often than not, the pro-landlord assignment clause is stated in terms of
prior landlord approval, such as "Without the previous written consent of
Landlord, neither Tenant nor Tenant's legal representatives or successors in
interest by operation of law or otherwise, shall assign . . . this lease."' The
emphasized language is considered by some to lessen the effect of the re-
striction because it suggests the possibility of approval.'
Courts have held that a landlord may arbitrarily reject a proposed assignee
of a tenant who is a party to a lease containing an approval clause such as
the one recited above without even stating a reason for the rejection.8
Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Taylor, 242 Ky. 157, 45 S.W.2d 1039 (1932). An assignment made in
breach of a clause in the lease prohibiting assignment without landlord consent is not void, but
is voidable only at the lessor's option. Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 60 (9th Cir. 1931);
Webster v. Nicholas, 104 I11. 160, 171 (1882). Generally, a restriction against assignment is for
the landlord's benefit and may therefore be waived by him. See Stark v. National Research &
Design Corp., 33 N.J. Super. 315, 110 A.2d 143 (1954).
4. 11 Am. JuR. LEGAL FORMS 2d Leases of Real Property § 161:644 (1972).
5. Id. § 161:655. There are countless variations of restrictive language pertaining to assign-
ments suggested by authors of form books. See, e.g., 11 Am. Jun. LEGAL FORMS 2d Leases of
Real Property §§ 161:641:668 (1972); MODERN LECAL FORMS §§ 5191-5192 (1962); 5A NICHOLS
CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMs ANNOTATED §§ 5.1961-.1984 (1974); 10 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON,
CURRENT LECAL FORMS WITH TAx ANALYSIS 23.31(1)-(16) (1980).
Of course, when a lease absolutely prohibits assignment, the parties are not precluded from
reaching a subsequent agreement permitting a proposed assignment. See Arlu Assoc., Inc. v.
Rosner, 14 A.D.2d 272, 220 N.Y.S.2d 288, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 693, 185 N.E.2d 913, 233
N.Y.S.2d 477 (1962).
6. 1 M.R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 7.303el, at 182 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
FRIEDMAN] (emphasis added).
7. See text accompanying notes 63 & 70 infra.
8. E.g., Richard v. Degen Brody, Inc., 181 Cal. App. 2d 289, 5 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1960)
(absent qualification in lease, lessor may arbitrarily and without regard to financial status of
sublessee withhold consent to sublet); Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher & Co., 88 A.2d 321 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1952) (lessor under no duty to accept subtenant left in possession by defaulting
tenant); Dutch Inns of Am., Inc. v. United Va. Leasing Corp., 134 Ga. App. 525, 215 S.E.2d
290 (1975) (assignment of lease by lessee without written consent of lessor void); Jacobs v.
Klawans, 225 Md. 147, 169 A.2d 677 (1961) (right of lessor to arbitrarily reject sublessee upheld
despite social evils flowing from restraint on alienation); White v. Huber Drug Co., 190 Mich.
212, 157 N.W. 60 (1916) (corporate tenant's assignment to reorganized corporate successor in
interest violated assignment approval clause); Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247
Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956) (proferred subtenant would pay 20% less rent-court empha-
sized importance of not judicially changing terms of existing leases); Segre v. Ring, 103 N.H.
278, 170 A.2d 265 (1961) (lease containing plain and unqualified restriction against assignment
valid even though lessors were town selectmen); Zuker v. Dehm, 128 N.J.L. 435, 26 A.2d 564
(N.J. 1942) (lessor under no obligation to relet abandoned apartment where lease required
lessor's written consent to sublet); Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinique Assocs., 12
N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963) (lessor may refuse to rent to proposed
sublessee, cancel lease, and lease to same proposed sublessee for increased rent); Coulos v.
Desimone, 34 Wash. 2d 87, 208 P.2d 105 (1949) (lessor's right to arbitrarily refuse sublease not
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Moreover, the approval clause has been considered a freely bargained un-
qualified prohibition of assignment.9 This position has not, however,
escaped challenge.'" Most significantly, it was rejected by the American
Law Institute in the 1977 edition of the Restatement of Property." Section
15.2(2) of the Restatement provides:
A restraint on alienation without the consent of the landlord of the
tenant's interest in the leased property is valid, but the landlord's consent
to an alienation by the tenant cannot be withheld unreasonably, unless a
freely negotiated provision in the lease gives the landlord an absolute right
to withhold consent.
2
The Reporter's Note and Comment make clear that the commonly used
approval clause language does not satisfy the Restatement test for a clause
providing "an absolute right to withhold consent." 13
The Reporter acknowledged that the Restatement set forth a minority
position but indicated that support for the Restatement rule could be found
in several jurisdictions." The Restatement suggested that the degree of
reasonableness required of the landlord "be appraised from cases in which
the lease agreement has stipulated that such consent shall not be withheld
impaired by alleged damage to lessee's business). See also I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.58
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3A THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 1211, at 67.
Early Illinois law supported this position. See Drake v. Diggins, 314 Ill. App. 192, 39 N.E.2d
1023 (1st Dist. 1942) (abstract opinion); Millers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Insurance Exch. Bldg. Corp.,
218 11. App. 12 (1st Dist. 1920) (rejection of characterization of refusal to give consent as
interference with lessee's right to contract). But see Arrington v. Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp.,
30 Ill. App. 3d 631, 333 N.E.2d 50 (1st Dist. 1975) (a lessor's refusal to accept tenant judged by
reasonable commercial standards). A more in-depth discussion of Illinois law is contained in
notes 102-122 and accompanying text infra.
9. See, e.g., Clasen v. Moore Bros. Realty Co., 413 S.W.2d 592, 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967)
(forfeiture of lease when assignment prohibition violated not harsh remedy because lessee freely
assented to it).
10. Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956)
(the court adopted the majority rule on mitigation of damages, stimulating the first wave of
criticism). See Comment, Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon Tenant's Default, 24 U.
CI. L. REV. 567 (1957); Note, Real Property-Landlord and Tenant-Lessor's Arbitrary With-
holding of Consent to Sublease, 55 MICH. L. REV. 1029 (1957); Note, Landlord and
Tenant-Right of Lessor to Refuse Any Settlement When Lease Prohibits Transfer Without Con-
sent, 41 MINN. L. REV. 355 (1957).
11. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 15.2(2) (1977) [hereinafter cited RESTATEMENT].
12. Id.
13. Id. Comment a & Reporter's Note 7.
14. Id. Reporter's Note 7. Those jurisdictions include: Alabama (Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc.
v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977)), Illinois (Arrington v. Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp., 30
Ill. App. 3d 631, 333 N.E.2d 50 (Ist Dist. 1975); Reget v. Dempsey-Tegler & Co., 70 Ill. App.
2d 32, 216 N.E.2d 500 (5th Dist. 1966); Scheinfeld v. Muntz TV, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 8, 214
N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1966); Wohl v. Yelen, 22 Ill. App. 2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (1st Dist.
1959)), Kansas (Marmont v. Axe, 135 Kan. 368, 10 P.2d 826 (1932)), Massachusetts (Granite
Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 36 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1940)), and Ohio
(Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584 (Shaker
Heights Mun. Ct. 1971)).
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unreasonably."' The Comment to section 15.2 summarizes this case law
position by indicating that an objective test of reasonableness is to be
applied; 16 elaborating, the Comment states that "most courts look to the
standard of the reasonably prudent man, and leave no room for considera-
tions of personal taste and convenience.""r Thus, the Restatement rule
effectively incorporates into the approval clause an implied covenant not to
unreasonably withhold consent.
15. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2(2), Reporter's Note 7. For a discussion of these
cases, see Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 689 (1973), and Todres & Lerner, Assignment and Subletting of
Leased Premises: The Unreasonable Withholding of Consent, 5 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 195 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Todres & Lerner].
16. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2, Comment g. The Restatement merely imposes the
reasonableness requirement; it does not define the standard for measuring reasonableness. For
direction on this, one must look to the Comment and Reporter's Note to Section 15.2. Although
the applicable standard of reasonableness is repeatedly characterized therein as "objective,"
there is perhaps an indication that something less than a purely objective analysis may be
appropriate. For example, it is acknowledged in Comment g that "[a] reason may be reasonable
in relation to residential property that is the personal home of the landlord that would not be
reasonable as to other residential property." Such an added consideration would seem to be at
variance with the traditional standard of objective reasonableness which would foreclose regard
of personal tastes. Were this the only aberration it could be justified by the logic of treating
residential and commercial leases with different rules. See note 18 infra. Illustration 7 of Com-
ment g, however, also seems to be at variance with a strict test of objective reasonableness.
Illustration 7 reads:
L leases commercial property to T, the lease requiring L's consent to any assign-
ment or sublease. L wanted T personally as a tenant because he thought T's pres-
ence on the leased property would improve the commercial tone of the area and L
owned the commercial property nearby. L gave T quite favorable terms to induce T
to locate his business on the leased property. T requests L's permission to assign
the lease to Tl, who is also a successful businessman. It may be found that L's
refusal to consent under the circumstances is reasonable.
In agreeing to rent the property on such favorable terms, surely L would have a good opportu-
nity to negotiate an absolute restriction on assignment. Strict adherence to the Restatement
would thus lead to the conclusion that the absence of such a clause is an expression of a
contrary intent. Therefore, a purely objective analysis of reasonableness would not give consid-
eration to L's personal desire to have T above all others as tenant unless it was so expressed in
the lease; nor would it permit special treatment because of this particular landlord's interest in
other non-integrated property, Cf. Krieger v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 62 N.J. 423, 302 A.2d 129
(1973). For a discussion of English cases making a distinction between nonintegrated properties
and several properties forming an integrated unit, see Todres & Lerner, supra note 15, at
204-07.
The treatment of cases involving an express convenant not to unreasonably withhold consent
has been largely confined to an objective analysis, sometimes using the label "commercially
reasonable." Some of these cases, however, do seem to vary from strict objectivity, giving some
weight to subjective elements. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Rockefeller Center, Inc., 174 Misc. 441,
20 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Term 1940) (landlord was justified in objecting to assignment to a cor-
poration whose name, Rockefeller Purchasing Corp., could be misleadingly confused with that
of landlord); Butterick Pub. Co. v. Fulton & Elm Leasing Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N.Y.S. 86
(Sup. Ct. 1928) (landlord's objection to a proposed subtenant because of the similarity of busi-
ness to that of landlord's other tenants in the neighborhood was upheld as reasonable). Thus,
while the Comment and Reporter's Note refer to a standard of objective reasonableness with no
room for consideration of distinctions of the particular landlord involved, some of the discussion
and authority is suggestive of a lesser standard, at least in certain circumstances.
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This Article reviews the case law in support of the Restatement position,
analyzes the Restatement rule, and suggests that the Reporter's test for
measuring the reasonableness of withholding consent not be strictly followed
in the context of commercial leases.' 8 As a critical part of this undertaking,
the Article discusses the closely related subject of the landlord's duty to
mitigate damages ' in the event of tenant default, specifically addressing the
duty to relet the premises, a subject often confused with the landlord's right
to withhold consent to assignment. The Article emphasizes the relationship
17. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2, Reporter's Note 7. E.g., Chanslor-Western Oil &
Dev. Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 131 I11. App. 2d 527, 266 N.E.2d 405 (1st Dist. 1970)
(unreasonable for municipal corporation to withhold consent to sublet until establishment of
new rental rate where lease specifically provided for rental increases); Broad & Branford Place
Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (N.J. 1944) (reasonable person stan-
dard must be applied to determine if landlord was justified in refusing consent to tenant paint
store's proposed poultry store subtenant); American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Founda-
tion, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (lessor's refusal to sublet to
planned parenthood association rejected as contrary to public policy).
18. This Article is concerned only with commercial leases. Treating commercial and residen-
tial leases differently is logical for several reasons. First, in the commercial context a tenant's
right to assign is best characterized as an object of value that is often the subject of bargaining,
as noted by the courts. "[Wihere a businessman must make contingency plans in order to
protect himself against the unpredictable vacillations of business, both good and bad, the ability
to assign a lease is a valuable right for which he bargains and gives consideration." Ringwood
Assocs., Ltd. v. Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 310, 379 A.2d 508, 516 (1977). In
contrast, the typical residential tenant has little concern for assignment rights. If the matter
arises at all, it will arise long after the lease is consummated, and in connection with an unantic-
ipated abandonment. Second, the residential landlord and tenant relationship is traditionally so
one-sided that, like most lease provisions, rights of assignment are usually not a subject for
bargaining. Third, a landlord's concerns may be quite different regarding commercial and res-
idential leases. For example, a commercial lease is usually for a substantially longer term, and
the commercial tenant's identity is apt to affect the long-term market value of the rental
property. Thus, commercial landlords scrutinize tenants more closely than their residential
counterparts. The commercial landlord has traditionally demanded freedom to decide how the
property will be used and specifically who the tenants will be. A succession of commercial
occupants moving in and out is anathema. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 163. In fact,
many state legislatures, recognizing the differences between residential and commercial tenan-
cies, have afforded special treatment to the residential tenancy. See note 160 infra.
19. This Article uses the term "mitigation of damages" to refer to what is more technically
denominated the "avoidable consequences rule." The avoidable consequences rule imposes a
duty on a party to minimize the amount of damages for which another party would be liable by
exercising reasonable care and diligence to avoid further loss. See, e.g., Birge v. Toppers Mens-
wear, Inc., 473 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971). See also D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.7, at 186
(1973). Mitigation of damages, on the other hand, refers to proof of facts which tend to show
that the damages the plaintiff seeks are not as large in amount as claimed. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1153 (4th ed. 1968). Although technically mitigation of damages is an improper
term to refer to the duty of a party to a contract or a lease to not "run up" damages, the usage
is so frequent that it is almost accepted as equivalent in meaning to the avoidable consequences
rule. For examples of cases and authorities using mitigation of damages to refer to the avoidable
consequences rule, see Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277
N.E.2d 584 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971); Bulkeley, Does a Landlord Have a Duty to Miti-
gate Damages When a Tenant Abandons During the Lease?, 68 ILL. B.J. 588 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Duty to Mitigate].
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between the rules of assignability and mitigation of damages by reletting,
and notes the Restatement's curious positions on these issues-on the one
hand embracing a minority, pro-tenant position on the assignment issue and,
on the other, rejecting the popular pro-tenant minority trend regarding
mitigation. '0
THE CONFUSION OF THE ISSUES OF ASSIGNABILITY AND THE
LANDLORD'S DUTY TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
Before exploring the case law treatment of the assignability issue and the
confusion evident therein, it is necessary to consider the relationship be-
tween the concepts of assignability and the landlord's duty to mitigate dam-
ages. As will be seen, the relationship of the concepts stems not from any
affinity grounded in legal doctrine, but rather from the simple fact that the
issues often arise from the same fact pattern. That is, commonly a tenant
produces a party to whom he or she desires to assign his or her lease and
asks the landlord to approve the assignment-at this point the assignment
issue is raised. If the landlord refuses to allow the assignment, the tenant
frequently abandons the premises. If the landlord then sues the tenant for
rents accruing subsequent to abandonment, the tenant often defends by
asserting that the landlord had a duty to mitigate damages by reletting-at
this point the mitigation issue is raised. Before considering this common fact
pattern in more detail, it is useful to establish the legal distinction between
the assignability and mitigation issues. This can be accomplished by examin-
ing the positions of those who advocate and those who oppose both the
imposition of a duty to mitigate damages upon landlords and the ability of a
landlord to unreasonably withhold consent to assignment.
Rationales for the Varying Rules on Assignability and Mitigation
In evaluating the mitigation issue,2' the distinction between a contract and
a lease is critical.' Proponents of mitigation have emphasized the changed
20. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 12.1(3). This section does not impose on the landlord a
duty to mitigate the tenant's damages by reletting the premises, but rather provides:
(3) Except to the extent the parties to the lease validly agree otherwise, if the
tenant abandons the leased property, the landlord is under no duty to attempt
to relet the leased property for the balance of the term of the lease to mitigate
the tenant's liability under the lease, including his liability for rent, but the
landlord may:
(a) accept the tenant's offer of surrender of the leased property, which offer is
inherent in the abandonment, and thereby terminate the lease, leaving the
tenant liable only for rent accrued before the acceptance and damage caused
by the abandonment; or
(b) notify the tenant that he will undertake to relet the leased property for the
tenant's account, thereby relieving the tenant of future liabilities under the
lease, including liability for future rent, to the extent the same are per-
formed as a result of a reletting on terms that are reasonable.
21. See generally Duty to Mitigate, supra note 19.
22. See Hicks, The Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443
(1972).
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character of the landlord and tenant relationships, contending that while
leases were once solely proprietary in nature, contemporary leases now in-
clude other substantial mutual obligations and are therefore more contractual
in nature.'5 Moreover, it is asserted that pure conveyance theory is absurd
when applied to the modern urban lease.u Modern leases, typically for a
portion of a larger building, generally contemplate a continuous mutual ex-
change of consideration, not a single unilateral conveyance. Because changes
in circumstances have rendered the historical lease-contract distinction sus-
pect, it is often asserted that contract principles, including the duty to miti-
gate damages, should apply to leases. 2
Opponents of mitigation emphasize that tenants should not by their own
wrongdoing be able to impose a duty on their landlord. 2 At least one court
has taken the position that imposition of a duty to mitigate damages when a
lease has been breached results in a legal absurdity; there can be no duty to
mitigate damages because the landlord has no right to re-rent the property if
the landlord has not accepted the tenant's surrender; if the landlord has
accepted the property and re-rented it, a recission of the lease would have
occurred, releasing the tenant from the rent obligation. 21 Comment i to
23. See Note, Contract Principles and Leases of Realty, 50 B.U. L. REV. 24 (1970). De-
cisional law indicates the judiciary's willingness to apply contract law to leases between land-
lords and tenants. For example, in Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969), the
court applied contract law to a lease of an urban dwelling and implied a warranty of habitability
which it found the landlord had breached. Accord, Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971). Following Lemle, it
has been suggested that in leases involving urban dwelling units, contract law may be applied to
all aspects of leases and will not be limited to the implied warranty of habitability. Note, Javins
v. First National Realty Corp., 84 HARV. L. REV. 729 (1971).
The application of contract law to lease interpretation necessitates that leases be construed
like other contracts. This construction effectively promotes consumer protection because courts
have broadened seller's responsibility for the quality of goods sold by implying warranties of
merchantability and fitness. Similarly, in landlord-tenant relations, the law should protect
tenants' reasonable expectations regarding enforcement of lease terms whenever tenants cannot,
for reasons beyond their control but in the hands of landlords, protect themselves. See Javins v.
First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
24. See, e.g., Bennett, The Modern Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract (Damages for
Anticipatory Breach and Interdependency of Covenants), 16 TEX. L. REV. 47 (1937). But see
Siegel, Is the Modern Lease a Contract or a Conveyance?-A Historical Inquiry, 52 J. URB. L.
649 (1975) (propounding the wisdom of a mixed conveyance and contract theory).
25. See Sommer v. Kridel, 74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977). See also cases collected in
Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968). See generally 2 FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 16.3; Hicks, The
Contractual Nature of Real Property Leases, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 443 (1972); McCormick, The
Rights of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of the Premises by the Tenant, 23 Mich. L. REV.
211 (1925); Comment, Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages-A New Obligation, 16 AM. Bus.
L.J. 351 (1979); Comment, Landlord's Duty to Mitigate 'by Accepting a Proffered Acceptable
Subtenant---Illinois and Missouri, 10 ST. Louis U. L.J. 532 (1966); Note, Landlord-Tenant-
Landlord's Duty to Relet When a Tenant Abandons Leased Property, 43 Mo. L. REV. 359
(1978).
26. E.g., Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 74 S.W.2d 640 (1934); Jordon v. Nickell, 253
S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1952).
27. See Haycock v. Johnston, 81 Minn. 49, 83 N.W. 494 (1900).
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Restatement section 12.1(3) indicates that the modern policy approved by
the American Law Institute in deciding to reject a duty to mitigate damages
is that "[a]bandonment of property is an invitation to vandalism, and the law
should not encourage such conduct."' Moreover, opponents of mitigation
seek to retain, at least in part, the historical distinction between a lease, as a
purchased interest in real estate, and a purely executory contract.9
This lease-contract distinction, although important to the mitigation issue,
is nevertheless largely unrelated to the assignment issue, a fact illustrating
an important distinction between assignment and mitigation. The primary
concern of the courts with respect to assignment is interpretation of the
lease. In this regard, lease interpretation usually focuses on three interacting
matters-one of intent and two of policy. First, and most important, is the
intent of the parties. The fundamental inquiry is what the parties to the
lease actually intended with respect to the landlord's ability to prevent a
transfer of the tenant's interest.3° Second, is the long-standing policy against
restraints on alienation.3 The third is the duty of good faith which may be
imposed upon parties to legal transactions."
Advocates of the minority rule on the assignment issue take the position
that if some element of uncertainty or ambiguity can be found in the restrictive
language, the clause should be construed in a manner that promotes, rather
than restricts, transferability.Y Those advocates assert that language men-
tioning approval is ambiguous because it suggests that approval can be se-
cured if a reasonably acceptable tenant is presented; this "false" expectation
should therefore be given effect by making the parties to an approval clause
deal with each other "reasonably" or in "good faith." '
Supporters of the majority rule take the position that the approval clause
is clear and unambiguous; landlord has exercised a personal choice in the
selection of tenant and has expressly indicated that only a substitute tenant
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 12.1(3), Comment i.
29. See Comment, Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages-A New Obligation, 16 AM. Bus.
L.J. 351 (1979).
30. See notes 129-130 and accompanying text infra.
31. A lease restriction against assignments of the term, while valid, nevertheless constitutes
a restraint against alienation. Such restrictions are strictly construed by the courts against the
lessor and in favor of the lessee. Gazley v. Williams, 147 F. 678 (6th Cir.), affd, 210 U.S. 41
(1908); Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977); Lawrence v. Cooper
Independent Theatres, 177 Kan. 125, 276 P.2d 350 (1954); Plotkin v. Milwaukee Metal Working
Co., 255 Wis. 456, 39 N.W.2d 439 (1949).
32. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tailored Women, Inc., 309 N.Y. 248, 128 N.E.2d 401 (1955)
(every lease includes an implied convenant of fair dealing); M. O'Neil Supply Co. v. Petroleum
Heat & Power Co., 280 N.Y. 50, 19 N.E.2d 676 (1939). Cf. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), -203 (honesty
in fact required in all U.C.C. transactions); notes 139-142 and accompanying text infra.
33. See Boyd v. Fraternity Hall Ass'n, 16 II1. App. 574 (2d Dist. 1885); Wood v. Hatcher,
199 Kan. 238, 428 P.2d 799 (1967); American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation,
Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
34. E.g., Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977). For a discus-
sion of this case, see notes 57-70 and accompanying text infra.
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to which he or she consents shall be acceptable. Supporters also contend
that many leases now in effect covering a substantial amount of real property
were carefully prepared by competent counsel in reliance upon the accepted
and longstanding interpretation of the assignment clause, and that should a
tenant desire to protect the right to transfer the estate to a suitable substi-
tute, a clause can be readily inserted in the lease to the effect that landlord's
consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.-"
In short, the various contentions regarding mitigation and assignability are
not transferable. The mitigation dispute turns on the validity of a lease-
contract distinction; the assignability controversy centers on lease interpreta-
tion. Moreover, the lease-contract distinction is unrelated to assignability
questions, and lease interpretation has no relation to questions of mitigation.
The authorities that confuse the two issues simply fail to grasp the differ-
ence. Having outlined the arguments both in favor of and against the duty to
mitigate and the propriety of the landlord's right to unreasonably withhold
consent to assignment, it is worthwhile to briefly consider the contexts in
which these issues arise.
The Two Fact Patterns Creating Confusion of the
Mitigation and Assignability Issues
In considering the subject of this article, a distinction between two com-
monly confused situations must be noted.3 The first, which is the target of
the assignment approval clause, occurs when a tenant wishes to assign to a
party produced by the tenant. 37 If the lease is silent on assignability, the
tenant is generally free to proceed.38 More commonly, however, leases re-
strict the tenant's rights of transfer by providing that the tenant must secure
the landlord's permission.3" The second situation occurs when a tenant
abandons the premises during the tenancy and is sued by the landlord for
rent accruing thereafter. The tenant typically defends by asserting that the
landlord should have attempted to mitigate damages by seeking a new
tenant.' The combination of the two longstanding majority rules pertaining
to these situations-when the lease contains a standard approval clause the
35. E.g., Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377
(1956).
36. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text infra.
37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.304a, at 187.
38. See McFadden-Deauville Hotel, Inc. v. Murrell, 182 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1950) (assigna-
bility of lease not restricted by provision for rental to be computed as a percentage of income);
Valley Oil Co. v. Barberian, 344 Mass. 759, 183 N.E.2d 109 (1962) (assignment of filling station
premises included right to assign lease and option to purchase); Smithfield Oil Co. v. Furlange,
257 N.C. 388, 126 S.E.2d 167 (1962) (lease and option to purchase are assignable in absence of
statutory or contractual restriction). See generally 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
246[1], at 372.84-.85 (1977).
39. See 11 AM. JuR. LECAL FORMS 2d Leases of Real Property § 161 (1972).
40. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.304a, at 187. See, e.g., Scheinfeld v. Muntz TV, Inc., 67
I11. App. 2d 8, 214 N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1966).
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:109
landlord may, for any or for no reason, refuse to permit the tenant to assign,
and when the tenant has wrongfully abandoned the landlord need not
attempt to relet the premises-may effect a considerable hardship on a
tenant no longer having a use for the premises.4
Courts have often been confronted with cases in which a landlord refused
to approve the tenant's selected assignee and the tenant then abandoned the
property, resisting liability for future rents.4" In this instance, when addres-
sing the assignability issue, tenants' counsel have routinely buttressed argu-
ments directed at assignability with theory, policy, and authority more ap-
plicable to the mitigation of damages issue. 43  The courts have generally
been unclear whether they were deciding the nature of the landlord's right
to prevent assignment or the landlord's duty to mitigate damages.44 This
confusion likely has contributed to the split of authority across and even
within jurisdictions on these two issues. '
The assignability issue is of obvious concern in the majority jurisdictions
where there is no duty to mitigate damages. Unless the vacating tenant has
the right to transfer an interest in the leasehold estate and thereby secure
relief from or assistance in meeting the rent obligation, the tenant is at the
mercy of the landlord. 6
41. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.304a, at 189-90.
42. See Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs. Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956);
Zucker v. Dehm, 128 N.J.L. 435, 26 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1942). Cf. Friedman v. Thomas J. Fisher
Co., 88 A.2d 321 (D.C. Ct. App. 1952) (no abandonment because tenant left subtenant in
possession).
43. See Scheinfeld v. Muntz TV, Inc., 67 I11. App. 2d 8, 214 N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1966).
See also Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977); Gruman v. Inves-
tors Diversified Servs. Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956); Ringwood Assocs., Ltd. v.
Jack's of Route 23, Inc., 153 N.J. Super. 294, 379 A.2d 508 (1977). Homa-Goff is discussed in
detail in the text accompanying notes 57-70 infra.
44. An extreme example is Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78
N.W.2d 377 (1956). In Gruman, the tenant vacated the premises and sought the landlord's
approval to sublet. The court held that because the lease contained a prohibition against assign-
ment, the landlord had no obligation to accept a suitable tenant proposed by the breaching
tenant to mitigate damages. Id. at 509, 78 N.W.2d at 381. In so doing, the court confused two
situations. In the first situation, the tenant locates an acceptable tenant and requests the land-
lord's consent to a sublease. This gives rise to the issue of whether the landlord must consent to
the sublease despite the no assignment clause. In considering this issue, the Gruman court
failed to distinguish a second situation where the tenant abandons prior to the end of the lease
without locating a subtenant. The issue here is whether the landlord has the duty to mitigate
damages by finding a new tenant. Due to the court's confusion, the Gruman decision squarely
presents a conflict between a policy favoring the sanctity of the contractual no-sublease clause
and a policy favoring mitigation of damages and the free alienability of property interests. See
generally Comment, Landlord's Duty to Mitigate Damages Upon Tenant's Default, 24 U. CHI.
L. REV. 567 (1957).
45. Illinois is one state with split authority. See Duty to Mitigate, supra note 19; Morris,
Assignment and Subletting, 46 CHI. B. REC. 140 (1964). Illinois law is discussed more fully in
notes 102-122 and accompanying text infra.
46. See, e.g., Dutch Inns of Am., Inc. v. United Va. Leasing Corp., 134 Ga. App. 525, 215
S.E.2d 290 (1975); Glick v. Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co., 136 Pa. Super. Ct. 349, 7 A.2d 364
(1939).
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In the minority of states that recognize a landlord's duty to mitigate
damages,47 no practical reason at first appears for concern about the assigna-
bility issue. If the landlord withholds consent to an assignment, the tenant
will probably abandon and thereby trigger the duty to mitigate. The land-
lord would then be obligated to lease to the proposed assignee or to some
other tenant of the landlord's choosing. If the landlord does not relet, the
tenant would be relieved of future liability under the lease, the exact result
the tenant desires. 4
Even in a mitigation jurisdiction, however, the assignment issue causes
concern when the current rental value of the property exceeds the rent re-
served under the lease. If rental rates have risen sharply, a tenant desiring
to quit the premises will want to reap the benefits of a relatively low rental
by assigning an interest in the leasehold estate at a higher market rate rental
and thereby profit from the differential.41 If the landlord can refuse the
assignment, and the tenant defaults under the lease by quitting the prem-
ises, the landlord can acquire a windfall by reletting the premises at a higher
higher rent. If, however, the landlord must consent to a responsible assign-
ment, the tenant will benefit. Thus, receipt of the profit from the increased
market value of the leasehold estate is dependent on whether a landlord is
able to refuse a proposed assignment.- Other factual variations involving
47. This minority of states includes Arizona (Camelback Land & Inv. Co. v. Phoenix Enter-
tainment Corp., 2 Ariz. App. 250, 407 P.2d 791 (1965)), Arkansas (Baston v. Davis, 229 Ark.
666, 318 S.W.2d 837 (1959)); Illinois (Wohl v. Yelen, 22 11. App. 2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (1st
Dist. 1959)), Iowa (Vawter v. McKissick, 159 N.W.2d 538 (Iowa 1968)), Kansas (Gordon v.
Consol. Sun Ray, Inc., 195 Kan. 341, 404 P.2d 949 (1965)), New Hampshire (Novak v. Fontaine
Furniture Co., 84 N.H. 93, 146 A. 525 (1929) (by implication)), New Jersey (Sommer v. Kridel,
74 N.J. 446, 378 A.2d 767 (1977)), New York (Lefrak v. Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390
N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. 1976)), North Carolina (Weinstein v. Grifin, 241 N.C. 161, 84 S.E.2d
549 (1954)), Ohio (Stern v. Taft, 49 Ohio App. 2d 405, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 463, 361 N.E.2d 279
(1976)), Oregon (Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965)), South Carolina
(United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956)), Utah (Meyer
v. Evans, 16 Utah 2d 56, 395 P.2d 726 (1964) (by implication)), and Wisconsin (St. Regis Apart-
ment Corp. v. Sweitzer, 32 Wis. 2d 426, 145 N.W.2d 711 (1966)).
48. See T.A.D. Jones Co. v. Winchester Repeating Arms Co., 55 F.2d 944 (D. Conn.) (a
landlord failing to perform duty to mitigate damages had lost remedy against the breaching
tenant), aff'd, 61 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 609 (1933). Cf. Lefrak v.
Lambert, 89 Misc. 2d 197, 390 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Civ. Ct. 1976) (duty held breached where lessor
produced no evidence to establish lessor's good faith effort to mitigate damages); Marson, Inc.
v. Terwaho Enterprises, Inc., 259 N.W.2d 289 (N.D. 1977) (duty held breached where landlord
substantially raised rent while mitigating damages following tenant's breach).
49. See, e.g., Moore v. Bannister, 269 So. 2d 291 (La. App. 1972) (sublessee paid more than
double the rent paid by the lessee).
50. Cf. Bedford Inv. Co. v. Folb, 79 Cal. App. 2d 363, 180 P.2d 361 (1947) (landlord cannot
insist on receiving a share of the lessee's profit as the price for landlord's consent under an
express convenant that consent would not be unreasonably withheld). The situation presented
in the text is common in eras of high inflation and rapidly changing land values. The lack of case
law dealing with the issue of increased rent value is probably a function of the frequent settle-
ments fostered by an opportunity for both the landlord and tenant to receive money that
neither fully anticipated. In a typical scenario, a supermarket tenant leases space in a regional
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disputes over increased market value can arise when a tenant proffers an
apparently suitable substitute tenant and the landlord prefers to relet to
another party at a lesser rental, but nonetheless in excess of the amount
reserved in the lease. The dispute may also arise where a landlord prefers to
take over the property for his or her own use, intending simply to release
the tenant from the rent obligation."'
CASE LAW SUPPORT FOR THE RESTATEMENT RULE
As shown above, the two issues of mitigation of damages and assignability
involve different legal concerns, and therefore deserve independent consid-
eration. The American Law Institute has recognized this independent status,
and has rejected the minority pro-mitigation position by adopting Restate-
ment section 12.3(1), which favors maintenance, at least in this respect, of
the historical distinction between leases and contracts.5" The Institute,
however, embraced the minority position on assignments in Restatement
section 15.2(2) which gives the approval clause a new interpretation. 53
Although this section disfavors restraints on alienation by providing that a
landlord's consent cannot be unreasonably withheld, it is tempered by an
overriding accommodation for the parties intent-the qualification is added
that a freely negotiated provision in a lease that gives a landlord an absolute
right to withhold consent should be enforced.m
There is abundant authority opposed to the Restatement's position that a
landlord may not unreasonably withhold consent to assignment under an
shopping center, with the tenancy for a term of twenty years and with several options to ex-
tend. After several years, the tenant finds that a large regional shopping center location is not as
well suited to its business as a small strip center location. Consequently, the tenant wishes to
assign or sublease to five smaller retail tenants who will partition the space, and the tenant
intends to exact in the aggregate from these five tenants several times its own rent obligation.
The landlord cites the lease prohibition against transfer without the landlord's approval and
states that the approval will not be forthcoming, and the tenant then argues that the lease is
ambiguous and should be construed against the restraint on alienation. The parties compromise.
In exchange for a sum of money, the tenant agrees to an early termination of the lease. The
tenant thus receives a share of the increased rental value and the landlord benefits from the net
of the increased rents that will now be received, less the cost of regaining control of the rental
space. Perhaps the best anticipatory solution from the landlord's point of view is to secure a
clause granting the landlord the right to cancel the lease as an alternative to assignment. See
FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.303e3, at 185 (Supp. 1979).
51. Cf. Cedarhurst Park Apartments, Inc. v. Milgrim, 55 Misc. 2d 118, 284 N.Y.S.2d 330
(Dist. Ct. 1967) (withholding consent because landlord corporation's officer required apartment
held unreasonable). English courts have held that a landlord's consent "is unreasonably with-
held even when the landlord offers to pay the tenant the same price that the transferee is to
pay for the proposed transfer." Todres & Lerner, supra note 15, at 209 n.75. Modern English
law is consistent with Restatement § 15.2(2) because by statute every English lease with an
approval clause impliedly includes a covenant of reasonableness. LANDLORD-TENANT ACT, 1927,
17 & 18 Geo. 5, C. 36, 19, sched. 1.
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 12.3(1).
53. Id. § 15.2(2).
54. Id. § 15.2(2) & Comment i. See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
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assignment approval clause 51 Yet the Reporter and other commentators
have cited cases in support of the Restatement position, and one court has
adopted the Restatement rule subsequent to its publication.' An examina-
tion of these cases contributes to an appreciation of both the problem that
gave rise to this newly favored position of law and the nature and extent of
the foundation on which that position rests.
The Post-Restatement Case
The most recent rejection of the long-standing common law rule regarding
the approval clause is found in Homa-Goff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden.,"
Landlord Cowden and Homa-Goff Interiors had entered into a lease that
included the following restriction on assignment: "The Lessee shall not
assign or sublease all or any part of the demised premises except by and
with approval of the Lessor in writing. '" ' After several months' operations,
Homa-Goff realized that it would be financially unable to continue its busi-
ness. Homa-Goff therefore sought and reached a tentative agreement with
the state of Alabama to sublease the premises. After Cowden refused to
approve this transaction, Homa-Goff proposed to sublease to another party
and vacated the premises when this second proposal was likewise refused.
Cowden eventually leased the premises to the second proposed sublessee for
the same rental paid by Homa-Goff.
In an action brought by Cowden for lost rents, the trial judge ruled in
favor of the landlord, recognizing that a "landlord's withholding of consent
can be arbitrary and unreasonable."" 5 The Alabama Supreme Court re-
versed and adopted the minority position, holding that "even where the
lease provides an approval clause, a landlord may not unreasonably and ca-
priciously withhold his consent." ' The Supreme Court adopted a "reason-
able commercial standard" to judge a landlord's rejection of a proposed
transferee." Because the evidence in this case showed "extreme bad faith" 62
by the landlord, the court ruled in favor of the tenant.
Three Justices dissented, contending that "[t]o overturn a century and a
quarter of existing real estate law without giving contracting parties 'fair
notice' " destroys the law's predictability.' The dissenters were critical of
the majority for rewriting "a contract so as to rid it of its alleged moral
harshness,"" with the effect of rewriting "tens of thousands of existing real
55. See cases cited in note 8 supra.
56. See notes 57-70 and accompanying text infra.
57. 350 So. 2d 1035 (Ala. 1977).
58. Id. at 1037.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1038.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1039 (Bloodworth, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Almon, J., dissenting).
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estate leases in Alabama which were negotiated by lessors and lessees in
good faith reliance on ...existing law."
The facts of the case do indeed attract sympathy for the tenant. It cer-
tainly appears inequitable if a landlord is able to reject a proposed sublessee
of unquestionable financial means, to reject a second proposed sublessee,
and after tenant vacates, to rent to the second proposed sublessee while
bringing suit against the original tenant for lost rents. Yet, the facts may not
be as tainted as they first appear. Unfortunately, the Court did not report
the reasons, if any, given by the landlord for rejecting the first proposed
sublessee,M thus obscuring the landlord's motive. The original tenant oper-
ated a furniture store, and the first proposed new tenant-the State of
Alabama-almost certainly wished to put the property to a different use. If
the lease restricted the permissible uses of the premises, the landlord's re-
jection would have been reasonable because a suitable substitute tenant
should be willing to abide by all of the terms of the prime lease. 7 Surely,
for example, a landlord who negotiates a restriction in the lease allowing
only retail activities should not be forced to accept a non-retail use.6 Even
the Restatement position would not go so far as to force a landlord to permit
65. Id. at 1041 (Bloodworth, J., dissenting on denial of rehearing).
66. The court's silence indicates that the landlord may have expressed no reason for these
rejections. It would be unfair from this alone to infer bad faith on the landlord's part because it
might be the case that the landlord remained silent in reliance on the overwhelming authority
supporting his right to reject a proposed subtenant without giving reasons when the lease con-
tains an approval clause. The transaction in Homa-Goff predated the adoption of Restatement
§ 15.2(2). In this situation, the Restatement suggests: "The denial by the landlord or the tenant
of the other party's request that he consent to a proposed transfer without stating his reasons for
the denial, when requested to give his reasons, will be deemed a withholding of his consent
unreasonably . ..." RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2, Comment g.
67. See, e.g., Whitman v. Pet, Inc., 335 So. 2d 577 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1976) (restaurant tenant
assigned to party that failed to qualify under provision that assignee operate substantially the
same type, class, and quality of business); Reget v. Dempsey-Tegler & Co., 70 I11. App. 2d 32,
216 N.E.2d 500 (5th Dist. 1966) (lease provided that premises would not be used for purpose
other than an investment brokerage office; proposed transferee wanted to operate a beauty
parlor, and court stated that a landlord should not be required to re-let the premises for a
different purpose if he reasonably believes tht such use will damage the premises). See also
Texaco, Inc. v. Creenwich-Kinney, Inc., 39 A.D.2d 877, 333 N.Y.S.2d 544 (1972), affd mere.,
32 N.Y.2d 910, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1973); Pletz v. Standard Homes Co., 342
S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), But see Burr v. Spencer, 26 Conn. 159 (1857) (holding that a
lease authorizing lessee to quarry stone does not restrict use of premises to quarry purposes);
Otting v. Gradsky, 294 Ky. 779, 172 S.W.2d 554 (1943) (holding that provisions in lease stating
use of premises was not exclusive); Rapid Assocs. v. Shopko Store, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 516, 292
N.W.2d 668 (1980) (absent express restrictive terms, descriptive clauses in lease are merely
permissive and do not restrict tenant's use of premises).
68. Clauses that purport to limit a tenant's use have also been the subject of some interpre-
tive controversy. Thus, a restriction limiting use to a specified purpose "only" has been upheld,
Doherty v. Monroe Eckstein Brewing Co., 198 A.D. 708, 191 N.Y.S. 59 (1921), but a lease
merely stating a specified use has been held to be neither a restrictive convenant nor a con-
ditional limitation. Courts have interpreted such descriptions to be simply permissive. See cases
collected in Annot., 148 A.L.R. 583 (1944).
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assignment to a substitute tenant who insisted on terms different from the
original bargain.'
Likewise, the rejection of the second proposed sublessee in HomC-Goff
and the subsequent rental to that proposed sublessee can raise varying inter-
pretations of the landlord's motivation. Despite the court's insinuation, the
landlord may have had the best of motives. For example, Cowden may have
located a highly desirable replacement tenant, but when unable to consum-
mate the anticipated deal, may have let the space to the marginally accept-
able second proposed sublessee to mitigate the vacating tenant's damages.
Nevertheless, this case suggests a fact pattern illustrating the desirability
of rejecting, or at least altering, the long-standing majority rule by requiring
good faith conduct. Certainly, if Cowden rejected the proposed sublessees
only to treat Homa-Goff maliciously, all but the most staunch property rights
advocates would support the tenant. Moreover, there is no readily apparent
excuse for permitting a landlord to reject, without justification, a proposed
transferee and subsequently to rent to the same party while simultaneously
seeking damages for the interim vacancy. There is none, that is, unless one
simply believes that considerations of fairness are irrelevant when a tenant
has assented to the full and unlimited risks of the bargain under the lease.
The Illusory Authority
A case cited by the Reporter in support of Restatement section 15.2(2) and
considered by the court in Homa-Goff75 is Shaker Building Co. v. Federal
Lime & Stone Co. 7 Here, too, the landlord (Shaker Building Co.) and the
tenant (Federal Lime & Stone Co.) entered into a lease containing an
approval clause. Because its business had greatly increased, Federal Lime
wished to relocate and suggested that Shaker advertise the premises for rent
at the tenant's expense. Upon learning of Federal Lime's plans to vacate, a
month-to-month tenant in the same office building asked to occupy the
premises. Shaker refused without giving any reason. Six months later,
Federal Lime vacated. In a suit brought to collect rents, Federal Lime de-
69. Cf. Mitchell's, Inc. v. Nelms, 454 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970) (landlord acted
reasonably in refusing consent where the sublease would bind him to a longer term at a lower
rent); Filmways, Inc. v. 477 Madison Ave., Inc., 36 A.D.2d 609, 318 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1971), aff'd
mem., 30 N.Y.2d 597, 282 N.E.2d 119, 331 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1972). In Filmways, the sublease did
not expressly restrict the right of the subtenant to further sublet, nor did it place restrictions on
the subtenant's occupancy that were similar to the limitations placed on the tenant by the prime
lease. In both the appellate division and the court of appeals the majority held the refusal to
consent to a second sublease would be unreasonable because the subtenant was found to be
bound to the same terms as the original lease. 36 A.D.2d at 609, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 506, aff'd.
30 N.Y.2d at 598, 282 N.E.2d at 119, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 31. It appears from the opinion of the
majority and the dissent, however, that all the justices would have agreed that if the transferee
were to have received greater rights than those under the prime lease, the landlord would still
have been acting reasonably in refusing to give consent.
70. 350 So. 2d at 1037.
71. 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971).
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nied liability alleging "that plaintiffs owed a duty to mitigate damages by
acceptance of . .. [the month-to-month tenant] as sublessee.""
After surveying the law regarding a landlord's duty to accept or procure a
new tenant in mitigation of damages, the Ohio municipal court concluded
that there was pronounced disagreement among and even within the juris-
dictions, including Ohio.7 3 The court reasoned that ambiguities in the lease
should be construed against the landlord who had prepared it and that the
clause conditioning approval upon the landlord's consent was in effect a rep-
resentation that consent was possible. Such a representation, the court con-
cluded, embodied the notion that "consent will not be withheld under any
and all circumstances, reasonable or unreasonable."" 4 From this, the court
enunciated its rule that under an approval clause "consent may not be with-
held unless the prospective assignee is unacceptable, using the same stan-
dards applied in the acceptance of the original lessee." 7  Because the
prospective assignee had been a lessee of this landlord for five years, and
thereafter on a month-to-month basis, the court found that the assignee was
an acceptable tenant.7 6
Shaker illustrates nicely that tenants involved in assignment clause con-
troversies are not always in pathetic, failing postures and therefore do not
always create concern about the equity of rules governing the assignability of
leases. On the contrary, Shaker involved a tenant's success story and is
therefore less evocative of a protective pro-tenant reaction. Federal Lime
was not an unfortunate victim of circumstances, forced to seek some final
relief; rather, the tenant's business had grown. The landlord would under-
standably want to retain this prosperous tenant and enforce the advantages
of the bargained-for relationship.
Therefore, in the commercial setting, the tenant should not always be
portrayed as the unfortunate party in an assignability and mitigation
controversy.' A healthy commercial tenant may wish to discontinue leased
72. Id. at 247, 277 N.E.2d at 585 (emphasis added).
73. Id. at 249, 277 N.E.2d at 586. Ohio decisions demonstrate disagreement about whether
or not a landlord has a duty to mitigate damages following a tenant's breach. See Bumiller v.
Walker, 95 Ohio St. 344, 116 N.E. 797 (1917) (duty to mitigate); Stern v. Taft, 49 Ohio App. 2d
405, 361 N.E.2d 279 (1976) (duty to mitigate); Rosenberger v. Hearsnip, 42 Ohio App. 536, 182
N.E. 596 (1930) (no duty); Baker v. Herrlinger, 16 Ohio App. 253 (1922) (duty to mitigate);
White v. Smith, 8 Ohio App. 368 (1917) (no duty); Enquirer Bldg. Co. v. Menke, 28 Ohio N.P.
238 (1930) (no duty).
74. 28 Ohio Misc. at 251, 277 N.E.2d at 587.
75. Id. at 252, 277 N.E.2d at 587.
76. Id. An amusing and contrasting view was expressed in Millers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Insur-
ance Exch. Bldg. Corp., 218 I11. App. 12, 19 (1st Dist. 1920), where the court reacted to an
allegation that the proposed sublessee should be considered satisfactory because the proposed
sublessee was already a tenant of the same lessor by observing astutely that this very fact may
indeed furnish the lessor reasonable grounds for its refusal to consent to the sublease.
77. See, e.g., Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 36 F. Supp. 77 (D.
Mass. 1940); Arrington v. Walter E. Heller Int'l Corp., 30 111. App. 3d 631, 333 N.E.2d 50 (Ist
Dist. 1975); Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d
584 (Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971).
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premises for numerous reasons. For example, the tenant may discover that
the traffic count or neighborhood conditions differ from earlier assessment.'8
Sometimes a corporate merger or consolidation produces overlapping facili-
ties ending the need for certain space or necessitating larger quarters. Some-
times an owner with a profitable business desires to sell that business.7' As
a practical matter, a business often cannot be sold unless the leasehold can
be assigned in connection with the sale.M° It is when the prosperous tenant
desires to quit the premises or transfer a right in the leasehold that the rules
on assignability and mitigation are of greatest significance. This is the situa-
tion where the landlord is more apt to refuse the transfer and, in the event
the tenant abandons, to be carefree about reletting. In contrast, when the
matter involves a failing tenant, the practicalities of the situation will encour-
age cooperation and mitigation. Because the prospect of collecting damages
from the failing tenant will be poor, it will be in landlord's self-interest to
seek and accept a replacement tenant.8
Although the Shaker holding offers some support for the Restatement
position on assignment, it is not sound authority for the rule of Restatement
section 15.2(2) because the court mixed its discussion of the doctrine of
mitigation and the question of assignability.8 2 Further, the authority consid-
ered by the Shaker court was directed solely to the broader issue of a land-
lord's duty to mitigate damages. Although the court's narrow holding was
definitely limited to the approval clause context, and hence to the question
of assignability, the court was clearly sympathetic to the minority trend of
recognizing a landlord's duty to mitigate damages.' Yet, because the Re-
statement rejects the duty to mitigate damages, a case truly supportive of
Restatement section 15.2(2) would not draw its strength from the doctrine of
mitigation. Further, the language of Shaker possibly expresses a subjective
test of reasonableness in withholding consent to assignment rather than the
objective test of the Restatement. The court's statement that acceptability of
a proposed assignee should be measured by "the same standards applied in
the acceptance of the original lessee"' seems to permit consideration of con-
cerns purely personal to a particular landlord, concerns that would not
necessarily match those of an objective "reasonable commercial standard."
78. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 162.
79. Id. See. e.g., Scheinfeld v. Muntz TV, Inc., 67 II1. App. 2d 8, 214 N.E.2d 509 (1st Dist.
1966); White v. Huber, 190 Mich. 212, 157 N.W. 60 (1916).
80. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.1, at 162.
81. See, e.g., Popovic v. Florida Mechanical Contractors, Inc., 358 So. 2d 880 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Millison v. Clarke, 287 Md. 420, 413 A.2d 198 (1980); Hurwitz v. Kohn, 594
S.W.2d 643 (Mo. App. 1980).
82. 28 Ohio Misc. at 248, 277 N.E.2d at 585-86.
83. The court stated that it found "great difficulty" in reconciling an absence of a duty to
mitigate with general contract law. Id. at 249, 277 N.E.2d at 586.
84. Id. at 250, 277 N.E.2d at 587.
85. See notes 148-158 and accompanying text infra.
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The Restatement also cites in support, Granite Trust Building Corp. v.
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,' a federal district court decision applying
Massachusetts law. In that case, the tenant argued that it was excused from
performance under the lease by the unreasonable and arbitrary refusal of the
landlord to consent to an assignment. 7 Noting that no relevant Mas-
sachusetts authority had been brought to its attention, the court proceeded
to address the assignability question. It reasoned that because a lessee may
freely assign unless restricted by the lease, a covenant permitting such
assignment with the consent of the lessor is a covenant for the lessor's ben-
efit and is to be construed strongly against the lesson' The court observed
that the better view would require a lessor to offer some reasons for with-
holding consent when a lease restricts a lessee's rights by requiring prior
landlord consent. 9 Although concluding that the expression of such reasons
"must have been in the contemplation of the parties," the court noted that
courts and commentators stated the law otherwise.'O
The court's discussion of assignability was, however, mere dicta. In Gran-
ite Trust, the assignability issue was only one of two defenses raised by the
tenant, either of which would have defeated the landlord's motion for sum-
mary judgment."1 Because the tenant prevailed on the other defense, the
court found it unnecessary to reach a conclusion on the issue of assignability,
although it clearly indicated that had a conclusion been necessary, the
tenant would have prevailed.
To the court's credit, it did not intermingle the concepts of mitigation of
damages and assignability but limited its discussion of assignability to a con-
struction of a covenant in question. Nonetheless, any support in Granite
Trust for the Restatement position is merely federal district court dicta, and
the rule enunciated by the court falls considerably short of the Restatement
rule. The court stated only that "some reasons" need be provided for with-
holding consent. Although even this would have been a departure from the
majority rule, the court did not go so far as to suggest that an objective
standard be used in judging the propriety of the landlord's refusal to
consent. '
86. 36 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1940).
87. Id. at 78.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. The court in Granite Trust stated:
[If] the defendant denies the existence of any contract binding upon it for the
reason that the lease was not executed by any representative of the defendant hav-
ing authority to act, and [if the defendant] was excused from performance by the
unreasonable and arbitrary refusal of the plaintiff, [then the defense] presents a
genuine issue of material fact.
Id.
92. Id.
93. See text accompanying notes 148-158 infra.
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Marmount v. Axe,' is the oldest authority cited in support of the Restate-
ment. In Marmount, because the tenant's shoe store was failing, he asked
one of the landlords for permission to transfer the lease. The landlord re-
sponded that he would investigate whether the proposed transferee was re-
sponsible and, if so, the transfer would be acceptable.95 The proposed
tenant bought the business, assumed its operations, and paid rent over a
six-month period. The landlords then refused the assignment, and the new
tenant vacated. 6 Shortly thereafter, the landlords rented the premises to
another party at a lower rent and sought recovery of the differential from the
original tenant. In opposing the trial court finding that the proposed
assignee was financially able, ready and willing to accept the assignment,
the landlords argued for their absolute right to choose who would lease
the property and suggested that because they did not see fit to assign to
the proposed party, the matter had been put to an end." The Kansas Su-
preme Court disagreed:
Admitting the contention of [the landlords] that there was no agreement
on their part to accept the [proposed assignee] for a tenant, what was [the
landlords'] duty? Clearly it was to do everything they reasonably could to
lessen the injury they were about to suffer on account of losing [the
tenant].
We have concluded that this is a case for the application of the rule laid
down in Lawson v. Callaway. There it was said: "Where a tenant under
contract to pay rent on real property abandons the property and notifies
the landlord of that abandonment, it is the duty of the landlord to make a
reasonable effort to secure a new tenant for the property and obtain rent
from the old tenant under the contract.""8
Although the facts and conclusion of Marmount do indeed support the
result reached by applying the Restatement section 15.2(2) rule, Marmount
is a classic example of a mitigation of damages case. The court made no
attempt to identify the differences between the situations in which a tenant
simply abandons the premises (the simple mitigation of damages context)
and in which a tenant proffers a qualified substitute tenant prior to abandon-
ment (the assignment context). The court reached the obvious conclusion
that the mitigation of damages rule then in effect in Kansas would apply to
this case which had ripened from the assignment context to the mitigation
context. 9 Moreover, the Marmount court did not discuss the issue of
assignability. The opinion illustrates simply that the Kansas rule on a land-
lord's duty to mitigate damages may be applied to an abandonment that was
94. 135 Kan. 368, 10 P.2d 826 (1932).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 369, 10 P.2d at 826.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 370, 10 P.2d at 827 (citations omitted).
99. Kansas was a pioneer on the subject of a landlord's duty to mitigate damages. As early
as 1916, Kansas recognized that when a tenant quit its premises "it was ... the duty of the
[landlord] . . . to lessen his loss by renting . . . to some other person .... Hoke v. William-
son, 98 Kan. 580, 581, 158 P. 1115, 1116 (1916). In addition to Hoke and Lawson v. Callaway,
131 Kan. 789, 293 P. 743 (1930), which were quoted in Marmount, there is other early author-
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
preceded by an attempted assignment, and that in such a situation the rejec-
tion of the proffered substitute tenant may serve as evidence that the land-
lord failed to mitigate damages.
Interestingly, Marmount has been identified by Friedman,' a leading au-
thority on landlord-tenant law, as one of only a few cases in which a court
rejected the position that an absolute prohibition against assignment autho-
rizes a landlord to refuse permission for any or for no reason. Friedman
noted that several more cases are cited but that "these involve a landlord's
claimed duty to mitigate damages, not his tenant's right to assign or sublet"
and observed that "some courts have confused these situations and it is not
always clear whether the court is passing on landlord's right to forbid trans-
fer or on his alleged duty to mitigate damages." 12 However, because Kan-
sas was, and is, a "mitigation state" and because the Marmount court re-
solved the matter before it solely with reference to established Kansas law,
Marmount is every bit as suspect as the other confused cases that, as Fried-
man has noted, are sometimes erroneously cited in support of the Restate-
ment's minority position on assignability.
The Illinois Rule
The remaining cases cited by the Restatement in support of its rule are
from Illinois."°  In Wohl v. Yelen,"T a residential apartment lease contained
ity in Kansas for a landlord's duty to mitigate damages. See Guy v. Gould, 126 Kan. 25, 266 P.
925 (1928); Wilson v. National Refining Co., 126 Kan. 139, 266 P. 941 (1928); Steinman John
Hall Tailoring Co., 99 Kan. 699, 163 P. 452 (1917).
100. FIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.304a, at 188 n.4 (Supp. 1979).
101. The other cases are the Illinois cases discussed in notes 103-122 and accompanying text
infra.
102. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.303el, at 188-89.
103. Two features of Illinois law support the Restatement rule. The first is the long estab-
lished principle that forfeitures of leases are not favored and that Illinois courts will readily find
circumstances that indicate an intent to waive a forfeiture. See Waukegan Times Theatre Corp.
v. Conrad, 324 Ill. App. 622, 59 N.E.2d 308 (2d Dist. 1945) (lessor who accepted rent from
assignee barred from asserting forfeiture of lease based on provision stating premises could not
be assigned without written consent of lessor); Famous Permanent Wave Shop, Inc. v. Smith,
302 I11. App. 178, 23 N.E.2d 767 (1st Dist. 1939) (lessor who frequently accepted late monthly
payments barred from declaring forfeiture of lease based on "time is of the essence" provision);
Patterson v. Northern Trust Co., 132 II1. App. 208 (1st Dist. 1907) (lessor's attempt to declare
forfeiture of lease and thus acquire title to land and buildings for non-payment of several rent
installments barred as unwarranted where simple proceeding to enforce lien for rent supplied
complete remedy). A second feature of Illinois law that supports the Restatement position is
that covenants against assignments are strictly construed against the landlord in order to pre-
vent forfeitures. See Postal Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 155 Ill. 335, 40 N.E. 587
(1895) (covenants in lease restraining power of alienation are construed with utmost strictness
and all doubts must be resolved in favor of free use of property); Chanslor-Western Oil & Dev.
Co. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 131 I11. App. 2d 527, 266 N.E.2d 405 (1st Dist. 1970) (lease
covenant restricting lessee's freedom to sublet is construed most strongly against lessor);
Waukegan Times Theatre Corp. v. Conrad, 324 I11. App. 622, 59 N.E.2d 308 (2d Dist. 1945)
(clause in lease prohibiting assignment without lessor's consent is for benefit of lessor only and
does not render an assignment without consent void, but only voidable).
104. 22 I11. App. 2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (1st Dist. 1959).
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a prohibition against subleasing. The landlord's agent orally represented to
tenant Yelen that if a substitute tenant could be found at the same rental,
landlord Wohl would consent to a sublease. The agent then gave Yelen a
"For Rent" sign to place on the premises, but when the tenant presented a
prospective subtenant, the landlord's agent responded that "he would think
it over."" The landlord eventually refused permission to sublet, claiming a
desire to sell the building and a belief that a vacant apartment would pro-
mote a sale."" Yelen then vacated and Wohl brought suit for lost rents.07
Yelen asserted two legal theories: first, that the prohibition against sub-
leasing in the lease had been waived when the landlord's agent made the
oral representation and furnished the sign and, second, that the landlord had
a general duty to mitigate damages.'" On the first theory the court agreed
with the tenant, holding that the landlord was estopped to deny the validity
of the oral agreement and was bound to his waiver of the covenant against
assignment."" Acknowledging that the law in Illinois seemed somewhat un-
settled on the second theory,"" the court indicated that as a general rule a
105. Id. at 458-59, 161 N.E.2d at 340-41.
106. Id. Courts applying Illinois law often examine the landlord's basis for his refusal to allow
the lessee to assign the lease. See Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th
Cir. 1967) (lessor's refusal on basis of insolvency of proposed assignees or their association with
people of disreputable character held not "arbitrary or inconsequential"); Logan v. 3750 North
Lake Shore Drive, Inc., 17 Ill. App. 3d 584, 308 N.E.2d 278 (1st Dist. 1974) (evidence that
lessor denied approval of proposed sublease "in accord with long-established policy of the build-
ing" made prima facie case that refusal was arbitrary and unreasonable); Gelino v. Swannell, 263
Ill. App. 235 (2d Dist. 1931) (landlord's refusal to consent to proposed assignment on basis of
race and dislike of particular method of business held unreasonable).
107. 22 I11. App. 2d at 458, 161 N.E.2d at 340.
108. Id. at 459, 161 N.E.2d at 341.
109. Id. at 461, 161 N.E.2d at 342. See Webster v. Nichols, 104 Ill. 160 (1882) (lessor's
acceptance of rent from assignee constituted waiver of lessor's right of forfeiture on ground that
assignment was made without lessor's consent). See also Kaybill Corp. v. Cherne, 24 Il1. App.
3d 309, 320 N.E.2d 598 (1st Dist. 1974); Clark v. Hoering-Bucholz Co., 254 Ill. App. 60 (4th
Dist. 1929).
110. 22 I11. App. 2d at 461, 161 N.E.2d at 342. The Wohl court indicated that the Illinois
Supreme Court passed on this issue by way of dictum in West Side Auction House Co. v.
Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 186 Ill. 156, 57 N.E. 839 (1900). The West Side court stated:
Upon the abandonment of the leased premises by the tenant it was the right and
the duty of the landlord to take charge of the premises, preserve them from injury,
and, if it could, re-rent them, thus reducing damages for which the lessee was
liable.
Id. at 161, 57 N.E. at 841. This dictum, however, was rejected by the court in Rau v. Baker,
118 I11. App. 150 (1st Dist. 1905) (holding that there was no general duty to mitigate on mere
abandonment by the lessee). Several cases have similarly rejected the duty to mitigate. E.g.,
Hirsch v. Home Appliances, Inc., 242 I11. App. 418 (1st Dist. 1926); Harmon v. Callahan, 214
I11. App. 104 (1st Dist. 1919) (dicta); Scanlon v. Hoerth, 151 I11. App. 582 (1st Dist. 1909).
Other cases recognize a duty on the part of the landlord to mitigate damages by using reason-
able diligence to relet the premises. E.g., Marling v. Allison, 213 Ill. App. 224 (1st Dist. 1919);
Contratto v. Star Brewery Co., 165 Il1. App. 507 (4th Dist. 1911); Hinde v. Madansky, 161 Ill.
App. 216 (4th Dist. 1911). A few other cases have been cited in support of a duty to mitigate.
E.g., Levy v. Burkstrom, 191 I11. App. 478 (1st Dist. 1915) (abstract); McCormick v. Loomis,
165 I11. App. 214 (1st Dist. 1911); Reser v. Corwin, 72 I11. App. 625 (2d Dist. 1897).
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landlord need not seek out a new tenant after a defaulting tenant abandons;
however, the court found that Wohl had a duty to mitigate damages by
accepting the tendered sublessee."' Some doubt remains regarding the pre-
cise nature of the Wohl holding. The court clearly rejected the theory that a
landlord has a general duty to mitigate damages. The court was not clear,
however, whether the duty to mitigate damages applies whenever a trans-
feree is presented or just when the landlord waives a prohibition against
assignment.
This uncertainty was eliminated in Scheinfeld v. Muntz TV, Inc."' In
Scheinfeld, the landlord consented to a sublease of a warehouse, condition-
ing further subletting upon the landlord's written consent. Four years later,
the subtenant proposed a new subtenant at a lower rental and offered to
contribute the difference in rentals. The landlord refused consent and the
subtenant vacated."' In the suit that followed, the court ruled in favor of
the subtenant, relying on Wohl v. Yelen."' Significantly, the court made
clear that the two possible interpretations of Wohl were alternate grounds.
Thus, when a tenant tenders a suitable transferee, the landlord has a duty to
"mitigate damages" by approving the transfer; otherwise a landlord has no
general duty to mitigate damages."5 Moreover, although the Illinois rule
was stated in terms of "mitigation of damages," the Illinois courts have dis-
tinguished between the kind of "mitigation" rejected in Restatement section
12.1(3) and the kind favored in Restatement section 15.2(2)-imposing upon
a landlord a duty not to unreasonably deny a proposed assignment or sub-
lease under an assignment approval clause." 6
111. 22 Ill. App. 2d at 463-64, 161 N.E.2d at 342-43.
112. 67 I11. App. 2d 8, 214 N.E.2d 506 (1st Dist. 1966),
113. Id. at 11, 214 N.E.2d at 508.
114. 22 I11. App. 2d 455, 161 N.E.2d 339 (ist Dist. 1959).
115. 67 Ill. App. 2d at 11, 214 N.E.2d at 511. See also Kelley v, Chicago Park Dist., 409 Ill.
91, 98 N.E.2d 738 (1951) (plaintiff has duty to mitigate damages in actions where recovery of
money award is authorized); Hill v. Bell Discount Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 426, 188 N.E.2d 517
(1st Dist. 1963) (citing Kelley, court held that a broad no duty to mitigate damages principle has
not been applied in Illinois).
116. 67 Ill. App. 2d at 11, 214 N.E.2d at 511. This "mitigation" phraseology may, however,
be interpreted to impact certain applications of the Restatement rule. The Restatement rule is
explained in terms of the tenant's right to assign if the landlord's consent is unreasonably with-
held. In contrast, the Illinois rule expresses the landlord's duty to mitigate in terms of the
landlord's approval of transfer. If the court's genuine concern is mitigation, then that objective
can be accomplished in several ways. So long as damages are mitigated, the landlord should not
be obligated to accept the proposed transferee. The subtlety regarding profits from increased
rental value (addressed in the text accompanying notes 48-50 supra) illustrates the impact of this
interpretation of the Illinois rule. Under the Restatement rule, a tenant can assign the lease and
thereby benefit from the increased rental value. In contrast, a landlord taking the Illinois
mitigation language on its face should be able effectively to refuse the proposed assignment,
wait for the tenant to vacate, and then terminate the lease and re-enter. By reletting at a higher
rent to a tenant of the landlord's choice, the landlord should benefit from the increased value of
the leasehold estate. Damages would be undeniably mitigated, because there would be no
damages. If this is not the desired result, viewing the Illinois rule in terms of "good faith"
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Although the basic Illinois posture as established in Wohl and Scheinfeld
coincides with the Restatement rules on mitigation and assignment, those
cases did not set forth a standard for measuring the propriety of a landlord's
refusal to consent to a transfer. Because the landlord in Wohl unsuccessfully
offered a subjective reason for refusing permission, an objective standard
would apparently apply. In the subsequent case of Reget v. Dempsey-Tegler
& Co., "' the court, referring to Wohl and Scheinfeld for the rule of law,
sustained the landlord's refusal of a proposed subtenant because the offered
party was not "suitable." The court stated that to show an unreasonable
rejection of a proposed transfer, a tenant must show that the transferee met
reasonable commercial standards."' The analysis rested on the tenant's
creditworthiness and intended change in use of the premises. The court thus
seems to have engaged in an objective analysis consistent with the Restate-
ment test and akin to that used in cases involving an express covenant of
reasonableness. 119
In Arrington v. Walter E. Heller International Corp., 21 the Illinois Appel-
late Court for the First District stated in dicta that when a lease contains an
might make more sense, although the courts have not used that characterization. As such, the
rule might be stated as: if the tenant shows good faith by proffering a suitable transferee, the
landlord should act in good faith and mitigate damages by consenting to the transfer.
117. 70 I11. App. 2d 32, 216 N.E.2d 500 (5th Dist. 1966).
118. Id. at 37, 216 N.E.2d at 503.
119. The Reget court was concerned with the effect of the proposed variance in the use of
the premises by the subtenant, stating that under the reasonable commercial standard a land-
lord should not be required to relet the premises for a different purpose if he reasonably
believes such use will damage the premises. Id. at 38, 216 N.E.2d at 504. See also Consumers
Mkt. House Co. v. Powers, 192 I11. App. 89 (1st Dist. 1915) (abstract) (lessor not required to
relet the premises to person procured by tenant where such person desires to use the premises
for different purpose from that specified in lease). In a later case, Reget v. Dempsey-Tegler &
Co., 96 I11. App. 2d 278, 238 N.E.2d 418 (5th Dist. 1968), the same tenant alleged that the
landlord failed to mitigate damages by not using due diligence in acquiring a new tenant. The
tenant offered as evidence an affidavit of an employee of a real estate firm stating that the fair
rental value of the premises was between $200-$225 per month, and that inquiries were re-
ceived by the firm and forwarded to the landlord from prospective tenants interested in paying
up to $250 per month. The court reacted:
When we construe defendant's affidavit most strongly in its favor, we cannot con-
strue it to mean that it had tendered a suitable subtenant to plaintiffs. The most
that could be said of the affidavit is that the real estate firm received inquiries
concerning the rental of the property, which inquiries it turned over to the plain-
tiffs. In order to construe this affidavit to be a defense in this cause, we would have
to say that plaintiffs' duty to mitigate damages placed upon them the affirmative
duty to contact and investigate each prospective subtenant tendered by the lessee.
Id. at 281, 238 N.E.2d at 419-20. The court summarized by stating that the affidavit was insuffi-
cient as a defense because it did not state "that a suitable subtenant was offered to the plain-
tiffs." Id. The case illustrates the extremely limited nature of the duty imposed by the Illinois
rule.
120. 30 I11. App. 3d 631, 333 N.E.2d 50 (lIst Dist. 1975). This case involved an unusual
reversal of roles in that the tenant had been given the power to withhold consent to the leasing
of other space in a building leased in part to tenant.
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approval clause, "regardless of whether explicitly qualified to reasonable ex-
ercises of that power," a refusal to consent to a person acceptable by
"reasonable commercial standards" is an unreasonable exercise."' This
statement alone would seem to certify the court's straightforward acceptance
of the objective test of reasonableness. The court, however, clouded the
issue with its next statement:
Where the lease contains provisions giving further meaning to the clause
granting a person the power to withhold consent, then the standard by
which reasonableness is judged is varied accordingly ... A lease must be
interpreted and construed as a whole in order to adduce the intent of the
parties as to particular provisions since it will be presumed that everything
in a lease was inserted deliberately and for a purpose."'
By this, one might conclude that if any part of the lease contains language
reflecting landlord's subjective preferences, this language could serve as a
basis for refusal to consent to a proposed transfer, even though the objective
reasonable commercial standard would yield a different result.
It is clear from the above discussion that the cases cited by the Restate-
ment in support of its position that a landlord may not unreasonably with-
hold consent to assignment are less than persuasive precedent. Not only
have some of these cases confused the mitigation and assignment issues, but
they have been less than clear in articulating their precise holdings. Fur-
ther, although the Illinois cases have more clearly adopted an assignment
rule similar to that of the Restatement, these cases have not carefully deline-
ated a standard for measuring the propriety of landlord's refusal to consent.
It is thus apparent that the Restatement's position on assignment is not sus-
tained by compelling precedent and that therefore the Restatement rule, as
a departure from the common law, need be supported by some other per-
suasive authority or reasoning for it to be properly accepted by the courts.
CRITIQUE OF THE RESTATEMENT ASSIGNMENT APPROVAL CLAUSE RULE
The confusion of the issues of mitigation and assignment has diminished
the persuasiveness of the limited case law in support of Restatement section
15.2(2). The rejection of any long-standing rule of law should be preceded
by a thorough and systematic analysis of the relevant issues; the minority
cases relied upon by the Restatement display little if any such analysis.
Further, a judicially mandated change in the law should be justified by a
change in circumstances: yet, the only case discussions of changed circum-
stances have been with respect to the mitigation of damages issue.
The mitigation issue is crucially different from the approval clause issue.
As already noted, proponents of a new rule on mitigation have emphasized
that fundamental changes in the nature of the landlord and tenant rela-
121. Id. at 641, 333 N.E.2d at 58 (emphasis added).
122. Id.
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tionship make the application of contract rules, rather than antiquated lease
rules, suitable."' That there are differences between the historic and con-
temporary leasehold relationships cannot be denied. Although the argument
apparently did not persuade the American Law Institute to adopt the con-
tract rule on mitigation of damages, it has received considerable favor. The
number of jurisdictions that recognize the change, albeit a minority, has
grown in number" and many state legislatures have recently required that
residential landlords mitigate damages."'
In contrast, the need for a new rule with respect to the assignment
approval clause has not been clearly linked to any change in circumstances.
The altered nature of the landlord and tenant relationship that lies at the
heart of the mitigation of damages movement has never been offered as a
justification for a new rule on the assignment issue. Paradoxically, those
advocating a new interpretation for the approval clause seek a rationale in
the time-honored property law rule that restraints on alienation should be
disfavored. They ask for stricter adherence to this doctrine, and hence a
construction that militates against an absolute and unqualified restriction.
Although tenant-rights advocates may promote such reasoning, the argu-
ments fail to clarify why a lease assignment provision that has heretofore
escaped the anti-restraint construction should now come within its purview.
Two possible explanations for advocacy of the new Restatement rule arise,
neither of which is entirely satisfactory. The first, which has emerged as the
predominant theory, is that the approval clause no longer serves as a clear
statement of intent. The second is that a change in our fundamental
approach to legal relations has occurred such that every contemporary legal
obligation should be construed to contain an implied convenant of good
faith. 12
123. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
124. See Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1958).
125. E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.230, .320 (1975); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1370 (1974);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2565 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.670 (Supp. 1978); MD. REAL
PRop. CODE ANN. § 8-207 (1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1432 (1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 91.825
(Repl. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2847 (1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.310 (Supp.
1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 704.29 (West Spec. Pamphlet 1979); MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-
TENANT CODE § 2-308(4) (Tent. Draft 1969). Lawmakers in these states have recognized that a
short-term residential lease providing for many landlord responsibilities is more like a contract
than a conveyance and should in many respects be treated as such. In contrast, the typical
commercial lease retains more of the historical attributes of a lease, especially when it is a net
lease. Other considerations, such as the relative sophistication of the parties and the hardships
of the mitigation rule, have no doubt supported this distinction.
126. This explanation has not generally been associated in the literature with the assignability
issue, but is more apt to be found in discussions of the duty of mitigation of damages in a
residential lease. The issues of assignability and mitigation have, as has been discussed in this
Article, routinely been commingled. The combined posture found in §§ 15.2(2) and 12.1(3) of
the Restatement presents a curious split of the good faith concept. The landlord must accept a
proposed assignee in good faith, but need not use even minimal good faith efforts to relet
abandoned premises.
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Proponents of this first theory have asserted that the approval clause is
unclear and therefore should be construed to disfavor the restraint. 7 No
evidence is offered, however, to show that the meaning of the approval
clause is now unclear, and no explanation is given of what gave rise to this
alleged new uncertainty, although the overlooked confusion of assignment
and mitigation may be responsible. To the contrary, because over many
years courts have consistently interpreted assignment approval clauses, the
meaning would seem to have gained certainty.
The parties' intent must be ascertained in the construction of any lease
because a cardinal principle of interpretation is to give effect to intent.'
Intent is of special concern in considering the assignability issue because
application of the doctrine against restraints on alienation is dependent upon
some flawed expression of intent. That is, the doctrine is properly invoked
only if a clause is ambiguous. If the clause is clear and unambiguous, the
alienation doctrine should not be applied and the restraint on alienation
should be given its intended effect. 29 Although rules of interpretation and
construction are easily stated, they are not so easily applied; in practice in-
tent is always difficult to ascertain. When intent of parties to a contract is in
question, the parole evidence rule greatly reduces the scope of the inquiry;
attention is therefore directed to the intrinsic meaning of the words. If
words are doubtful in meaning or susceptible to more than one interpreta-
tion, they are to be construed against the drafter or party in whose favor
they work."3  Thus, in the case of an assignment approval clause, the con-
struction would be against the drafter, usually the lessor, and against the
restraint. This rule of construction is deceptive, however, because it assumes
that words either have or do not have a clear and certain intrinsic meaning.
Nearly any use of words is subject to multiple interpretation. "Whether or
not words ...are clear is itself not always clear." 31 Established meaning
must therefore be emphasized and language acquires established meaning
through custom, usage and convention.' 3'
127. See THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 1211, at 63-65.
128. 6 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890A (3d ed. 1962). See
Massachusetts Port Auth. v. United States, 456 F.2d 782 (Ct. Cl. 1972); American Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Lembessis, 116 I11. App. 2d 5, 253 N.E.2d 126 (1st Dist. 1969); Old Line Co. v.
Getty Square Dep't Store, Inc., 322 N.Y.S.2d 149, 66 Misc. 2d 825 (Yonkers City Ct. 1971).
129. E.g., Randol v. Scott, 110 Cal. 590, 595-97, 42 P. 976, 977-78 (1895); Adelstein v.
Greenberg, 77 Cal. App. 548, 555, 247 P. 520, 522-23 (1926).
130. Hoffman v. Clark Street Roadhouse, Inc., 79 III. App. 3d 41, 398 N.E.2d 238 (5th Dist.
1979); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 77 I11. App. 3d 478, 395 N.E.2d 1193
(1st Dist. 1979); American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Olympic Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 60
I11. App. 3d 722, 377 N.E.2d 255 (1st Dist. 1978).
131. Barbee v. United States, 392 F.2d 532, 535 n.4 (5th Cir. 1968).
132. See Weill v. Centralia Serv. & Oil Co., 320 III. 397, 51 N.E.2d 345 (1943). In Weill, the
Illinois Supreme Court stated that when a lease is unambiguous on its face, the parties may not
argue that the words used have a meaning different from their ordinary meaning. Id. at 402-03,
51 N.E.2d at 347. In that case, the court decided that the word "terminate" means a conclusion
of the landlord-tenant relationship prior to the expiration of the term of the lease and cited for
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In legal analysis, case precedent establishes meaning or certifies otherwise
established meaning." Not only is there considerable precedent evidencing
the meaning of the approval clause, but numerous secondary sources iden-
tify that clause as an absolute and unqualified prohibition which affords land-
lords the right to refuse consent to a proposed transfer for any reason or for
no reason whatsovever. ' A commonly used legal form book typifies the cer-
tainty expressed on this matter:
Often, covenants restricting assignment or subletting of leasehold interests
by their terms require the consent of lessor to such a transfer. 2] CAU-
TION: In the absence of anything expressed to the contrary in a provision
requiring the lessor's consent, he may withhold such consent arbitrarily,
irrespective of the character of the proposed assignee or sublessee or of
the other circumstances of the transfer. The lessee may find desirable a
clause that consent shall not be unreasonably refused or shall not be with-
held if the proposed assignee or sublessee is a responsible tenant.""
Other form books, encyclopedias, and similar basic sources are unanimous
on this interpretation of the approval clause language.'
its definition an earlier supreme court decision. Id. Clearly, in this case the court relied upon
the established meaning of a legal term of art and would not accept the argument that a legal
term used in a printed lease had a different meaning than that ascribed to it by the law. See
also Pedro v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 95 F. Supp. 59 (S.D. Cal. 1950) (where parties to a contract
are dealing with words of art, presumption is that they are used in the same sense in which
they are used in that art-the "art" being the branch of human activity with which the contract
deals); Speir v. Wheeler, 194 A.D. 769, 185 N.Y.S. 769 (1921) (court would not be persuaded
that "heir or heirs at law according to the statutes of the State of New York then in force per
stirpes" described the hereditable quality of the estate, stating rather that the words described a
class). See generally Young v. Illinois Athletic Club, 310 I11. 75, 141 N.E. 369 (1923) (rule of
practical construction has no place in the construction of a lease containing no ambiguity); Euro-
pean & N. Am. Ry. v. Maine Cent. R.R., 135 Me. 338, 196 A. 642 (1938) (same); Sky Harbor
Air Serv. v. Airport Auth., 174 Neb. 243, 117 N.W.2d 383 (1962) (same).
Contract and property law authorities are in agreement with this view. According to Willis-
ton:
There are some technical words and phrases that have acquired so definite a mean-
ing in law that it would be difficult to induce a court to give a contrary interpreta-
tion to the words, especially in a formal instrument, though from the whole docu-
ment and from surrounding circumstances it was highly improbable that the parties
attached to their words their technical signification.
4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 890A, at 590-91 (3d ed. 1962). In the
same vein, another commentator stated: "The construction given a lease by the parties ... will
have a great weight with the court in case of doubt as to its meaning, but an unambiguous lease
will be given effect in accordance with its language regardless of the construction put on it by
the parties." 3 THOMPSON, supra note 2, § 1052, at 190 (repl. 1980).
133. Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960). According to that court: "Stare
decisis is a principle of adherence, for the sake of certainty and stability, to precedents once
established. But it applies primarily to decisions . . . which invite reliance and on the basis of
which men order their affairs, e.g., in the field of contract or property rights." Id. at 361, 157
A.2d at 501.
134. See note 8 supra.
135. 11 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d Leases of Real Property § 161.641 (1972).
136. See sources cited in notes 5 & 8 supra.
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In construing a lease, each word or phrase should be given its established
meaning at the time the lease was made "' and, logically, a legal instrument
prepared by an expert should be presumed to have been drawn with knowl-
edge of pertinent judicial decisions that serve to establish the instrument's
meaning. 18  Because the assignment approval clause has enjoyed a well
established meaning, one must seriously question whether it may be prop-
erly characterized as ambiguous. If the questioned language has an estab-
lished meaning, then the intent of the parties is clear and should be given
effect. If an unqualified restraint on alienation is part of the bargain, then
that restraint should be fully honored, possibly subject only to a duty of
good faith.
Recognition of an implied covenant of good faith is a second explanation
for a new interpretation of the approval clause. In transactions governed by
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), a duty of good faith in the perform-
ance and enforcement of all agreements is now imposed."' Further, the
UCC binds merchants to a standard of commercial reasonableness in regard
to sales contracts. 4 ' This "good faith" or "reasonableness" is not implied in
fact, but in law; that is to say, the parties to the agreement did not neces-
sarily intend to be bound by "good faith" duties, but are so bound because
in a civilized commercial world parties should intend such duties and will
therefore be held to them. Although the UCC does not govern real property
leases, many UCC concepts have been extended beyond its scope.,'" In an
advanced commercial society, to ask that all parties to transactions deal with
one another in good faith is certainly no revolutionary matter regardless of
the context. This rationale therefore presents ample justification for a new
interpretation of the assignment approval clause-an interpretation that
137. See note 132 supra.
138. Cf. Weill v. Centralia Serv. & Oil Co., 320 111. 397, 51 N.E.2d 345 (1943). See note 132
supra.
139. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978 version).
140. Id. § 2-103(b).
141. See U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1. Comment 1 states that the UCC may be applied to
matters not expressly within its scope. The Comment cites with approval cases extending the
application of other uniform acts: Commercial Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v. Canal-La. Bank &
Trust Co., 239 U.S. 520 (1916) (Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act extended to case not within
its scope); Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479 (1934) (Uniform Sales Act similarly ex-
tended). Cases decided subsequent to states' adoption of the UCC have also applied the UCC
to matters not expressly covered. See In re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 370 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1966)
(in secured transaction matter covered by federal law, the Second Circuit nevertheless applied
the UCC); Carpenters & Millwrights Union Local 2018 v. Riggs-Distler & Co., 73 N.J. Super.
253, 179 A.2d 564 (1962) (court admitted that the hiring of labor was not within the UCC, but
applied its principles), rev'd on other grounds, 40 N.J. 97, 190 A.2d 844 (1963). See also Gil-
bride, The Uniform Commercial Code: Impact on the Law of Contracts, 30 BROOKLYN L. REv.
177, 203 (1964) (analyzing contract law changes made by the UCC and questioning whether the
UCC will be applied generally to contract law outside of its scope); Note, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 880, 887 (1965) (arguing
that policy of modernizing the law will be constricted if courts continue to refuse to apply the
UCC to situations in which it is applicable only by analogy).
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would impose a requirement of good faith dealings. The problem, however,
lies in the Restatement's use of an objective standard of reasonableness as an
expression of this duty.
American courts have not set forth with specificity what constitutes objec-
tively unreasonable conduct on the part of a landlord in withholding consent
to a transfer of a leasehold interest. " ' A review of the relevant cases con-
cerning the express covenant of reasonableness reveals, however, that the
financial responsibility of the proposed transferee typically has been
controlling.13  If the proposed transferee is financially able to perform the
covenants in the lease, other reasons are unlikely to justify a landlord's re-
fusal. If the original tenant guarantees the payment of rent and performance
of the other lease obligations, the landlord is met with an even greater bur-
den to sustain a refusal.'4 Positing an extreme, one commentator raised the
question of whether a landlord should even be able to require an assignee or
subtenant to be financially responsible and qualified to operate his business,
arguing that "inasmuch as neither assignment nor subletting releases the
original tenant from his lease obligations, it may be argued that landlord has
all he bargained for regardless of the wealth or skill of the assignee or
subtenant." Is Other factors that have been given some weight in the
142. The frequently cited case of American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation,
Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969), offers the most thorough delineation of
what constitutes objective criteria sufficient to render a refusal to consent reasonable. That court
distinguished the objective from the subjective standard by indicating that objective considera-
tions are those that are readily measurable criteria of acceptability from the point of view of any
landlord. Four such objective criteria were identified: (1) financial responsibility of the trans-
feree; (2) "identity" or "business character" of the transferee; (3) legality of the proposed use;
and, (4) nature of the proposed occupancy. Id. at 33, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 160.
A Restatement example is patterned directly after American Book:
L leases offices to T, the lease requiring L's consent as a condition to a sublease.
T proposes to sublease to Planned Parenthood, and provides evidence of that organ-
ization's financial responsibility and of its careful and orderly use of leased property.
L, a strict religious organization, refuses to consent to the sublease because its
members are unalterably opposed to birth control of any type. It may be found that
refusal to sublease is unreasonable, and T may sublease.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2, Comment g, Illustration 6. No hypothetical better illus-
trates the nature of an objective test of reasonableness. The objective test leaves no room for
consideration of personal or institutional reasons for refusal peculiar to the party in question,
regardless of the good faith nature of the subjective reason.
143. E.g., Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967); Johnson v.
Jaquith, 189 So. 2d 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Moore v. Bannister, 269 So. 2d 291 (La.
App. 1972); Haritas v. Goveia, 345 Mass. 774, 188 N.E.2d 854, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845,
rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 917 (1963); Grossman v. S. E. Nichols Co., 43 A.D.2d 674, 349
N.Y.S.2d 745 (1973), aff'd nem., 35 N.Y.2d 985, 324 N.E.2d 888, 365 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1975);
Roundup Tavern, Inc. v. Pardini, 68 Wash. 2d 513, 413 P.2d 820 (1966).
144. See Adams, Harkness & Hill, Inc. v. Northeast Realty Corp., 361 Mass. 552, 281
N.E.2d 262 (1972).
145. FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.304c, at 197.
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reasonableness determination are the character of the proposed transferee 4,
and the nature of the proposed use and occupancy of the premises.'47
Under an objective reasonableness standard a landlord is not permitted to
refuse consent on religious ' or moral grounds,149 because of genuine
ideological and philosophical differences" between the landlord and the
proposed transferee, or because of any other personal considerations of taste,
sensibility, convenience or preference.' For example, it has been held ob-
jectively unreasonable for a landlord to refuse a consent to a sublease on the
ground that the prospective sublessee was a business competitor of the
landlord 1 2 or of another tenant.' Courts have also held that a landlord
cannot base a refusal on extraneous matters such as the effect of the refusal
on other properties of the landlord that are not physically interconnected
with the property in question."
146. Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive, Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967).
147. Time, Inc. v. Tager, 46 Misc. 2d 658, 260 N.Y.S.2d 413 (Civ. Ct. 1965); Kroger Co. v.
Rossford Indus. Corp., 25 Ohio Misc. 43, 261 N.E.2d 355 (C.P. 1969). See generally Todres &
Lerner, supra note 15; Landlord's Unreasonable Refusal to Consent to an Assignment or a
Sublease, 10 PROOF OF FAcTs 2d 481 (1976). See also FRIEDMAN, supra note 6, § 7.304c, at
194-98.
148. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297
N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
149. Id. Cf. Roundup Tavern, Inc. v. Pardini, 68 Wash. 2d 513, 413 P.2d 820 (1966). In this
case, the landlord refused consent claiming that conversion of a retail business into a tavern was
detrimental to the leasehold. The court held for the tenant and found, first, that the landlord
did not consider the financial stability of the proposed assignee and, second, that the lease did
not restrict the nature of the allowed business activity.
A classic example of a morality-based refusal of consent would be where a landlord refuses
consent to a proposed assignment by the operator of a movie theatre to the operator of a chain
of successful pornography theatres who intends to show the same fare at the leased premises. A
morally-biased but sophisticated commercial lessor might draft around the anticipated problem
by carefully restricting the permitted use of the premises. When the unanticipated occurs,
however, the law should fill the gap pursuant to a rule that supplies the result that the parties
would most likely have desired had they had better foresight. As the example illustrates, this
process requires some consideration of personal sensibilities. Viewed in this manner, the test
stated by Shaker Bldg. Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584
(Shaker Heights Mun. Ct. 1971), might prove most fair and sensible, that is, whether the
assignee is acceptable is determined "using the same standards applied in the acceptance of the
original lessee." Id. at 250, 277 N.E.2d at 587.
150. American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d 31, 297
N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
151. See Theunissen v. Huyler's, Inc. 25 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1928); Broad & Branford Place
Corp. v. J.J. Hockenjos Co., 132 N.J.L. 229, 39 A.2d 80 (N.J. 1944). See also Note, Effect of
Leasehold Provisions Requiring the Lessor's Consent to Assignment, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 516
(1970); MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403 (Tent. Draft 1969).
152. Edelman v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 252 II1. App. 142 (1st Dist. 1929).
153. Theunissen v. Huyler's, Inc. 25 F.2d 530 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (landlord's attempt to pre-
vent competition with another tenant held unreasonable). But see Pletz v. Standard Homes Co.,
342 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) (reasonable to withhold consent when landlord believed
proposed assignee planned to induce condemnation of the property).
154. Krieger v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 62 N.J. 423, 302 A.2d 129 (1973) (refusal based on
proposed subtenant's negotiation with another landlord held unreasonable). But see Kroger Co.
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A Comment to section 15.2 summarizes the modern approval clause
dilemma:
The preservation of the values that go into the personal selection of the
tenant justifies upholding a provision in the lease that curtails the right of
the tenant to put anyone else in his place by transferring his interest, but
this justification does not go to the point of allowing the landlord arbitrar-
ily and without reason to refuse to allow the tenant to transfer an interest
in the leased property. Hence the rule of this section recognizes the re-
straint on the tenant as valid but allows tenant to alienate, in spite of the
restraint, if the landlord unreasonably withholds his consent to a
transfer. .... "
The key concerns addressed in the Comment are the "personal selection of
the tenant" and the refusal that is made "arbitrarily and without reason."
These concerns can best be balanced by imposing a good faith requirement
on the transaction. The imposition of a subjective standard of good faith
serves both to satisfy the legitimate concern of the landlord in choice of
tenant and to eliminate abuse of the tenant. The Restatement, however,
employs an objective standard as a reasonableness test. This objective reason-
ableness standard, which was derived from case law consideration of ex-
press covenants not to unreasonably withhold consent, imposes a burden on
landlords substantially in excess of what would be required by mere good
faith. While a good faith standard clearly eliminates the abuses of arbitrary,
capricious or malicious conduct, it does not deprive the landlord of bona fide
expressions of personal taste and convenience, or of honest intention. In
contrast, an objective reasonableness standard does not permit consideration
of genuine concerns peculiar to the particular landlord.1 s
v. Rossford Indus. Corp., 25 Ohio Misc. 43, 261 N.E.2d 355 (C.P. 1969) (reasonable to with-
hold consent where the assignment did not require a business compatible with building's design
and construction). For a discussion of these and similar cases, see Todres & Lerner, supra note
15, at 204-07.
155. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2, Comment a.
156. Because historically the general rule has permitted even arbitrary and capricious refusals
to consent, very little discussion has arisen of subjective reasonableness in connection with the
approval clause. One older case treating a somewhat unusual example of approval clause lan-
guage did touch on the matter, however. In Kendis v. Cohn, 90 Cal. App. 41, 265 P. 844
(1928), the lease in question, after prohibiting assignment without the prior written consent of
lessors, provided that "said lessees may, with the written consent of the said lessors, assign said
lease to any person or persons of good character and repute and satisfactory to lessors, upon
furnishing good and sufficient security to be approved by said lessors." Id. at 49, 265 P. at
846-47 (emphasis added). The trial court found tht the proposed assignee was of good character
and repute and that the lessor had "arbitrarily and unreasonably refused to accept him as as-
signee." Id. at 66, 67-68, 265 P. at 854. The court of appeals treated the lease provision in
much the same manner as suggested by this Article. Drawing on the law of personal satisfaction
contracts, the court stated that
the party to be satisfied is the sole judge of his own satisfaction, subject only to the
limitation that he must act in good faith .... If an assignee were presented who
was of good character and repute and was in fact satisfactory to the lessor, but such
lessor in bad faith and in order to prevent the lessee from effecting an assignment
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Where the landlord and tenant expressly agree that the landlord's consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld, courts have sanctioned refusals only
where justified by objective criteria. In an effort to introduce a good faith
duty in the lease, the Restatement has extended this analysis to the unqual-
ified approval clause. This extension is excessive. The Restatement
erroneously equates implied good faith with an express covenant of reason-
ableness failing to appreciate that an approval clause that has been qualified
by an express covenant of reasonableness differs from an unqualified apt
proval clause. That is, the intentions of the parties who have negotiated
qualified and unqualified approval clauses differ. The difference is that par-
ties to a qualified approval clause intended what the clause states-that con-
sent shall not be withheld unreasonably-and the term the parties used has
an established meaning and concommitant objective test: unreasonable to
the "reasonably prudent man,"' or, alternatively, to "any" landlord.' On
the other hand, parties to an unqualified approval clause had no such intent.
Therefore, the standard for measuring the propriety of a landlord's refusal
should differ depending on whether the approval clause has or has not been
qualified by an express covenant of reasonableness.'
without additional benefits to himself withheld his consent, the lessee would be at
liberty to assign and would be relieved from the obligation of the covenant.
Id. Another case construing similar language suggested much the same approach. In Millers
Mut. Gas Co. v. Insurance Exch. Bldg. Corp., 218 Il. App. 12 (1st Dist. 1920), the lease
provided that the lessee could sublet provided the proposed sublessee was in all respects satis-
factory to lessor. Id. at 14. The court rejected the notion that "'satisfactory" was to be judged by
what would satisfy a reasonable person. Discussing the law of personal satisfaction contracts, the
court held that lessor could refuse for any reason satisfactory to it.
157. RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2, Reporter's Note 7. According to the Restatement,
"[a]s to what constitutes reasonableness, most courts [in the context of a clause which provides
that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld] look to the standard of the reasonably prudent
man, and leave no room for considerations of personal taste and convenience." Id.
158. The court in American Book Co. v. Yeshiva Univ. Dev. Foundation, Inc., 59 Misc. 2d
31, 297 N.Y.S.2d 156 (Sup. Ct. 1969), indicated that "objective" standards are readily measur-
able criteria of a proposed subtenant's or assignee's acceptability from the point of view of any
landlord. Id. at 33, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 159-60. Accord, Homa-Coff Interiors, Inc. v. Cowden, 350
So. 2d 1035, 1038 (Ala. 1977) (landlord's rejection was judged applying a "reasonable commer-
cial standard").
159. While implying a convenant of reasonableness into an approval clause which does not
provide a standard for judging the propriety of the landlord's consent, the Restatement rule
does not completely ignore the difference between an express and an implied convenant:
If the lease specifically provides that the landlord or the tenant will not withhold
his consent to a proposed transfer by the other party unreasonably, the other party
has options not available if such obligation is merely imposed by operation of law.
Such specific provision in the lease is a promise and upon its breach the other party
will be entitled to all the remedies available for a breach of a promise (see §§ 7.1
and 13.1), including the right to terminate the lease. When a party to the lease
must rely solely on the rule of this section, he is simply free to alienate if the other
party withholds consent unreasonably, but cannot obtain damages.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 11, § 15.2, Comment h. Although such a distinction may give tenants
reason to negotiate an express convenant, in practice the qualifying language is probably viewed
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CONCLUSION
The overwhelming authority indicates that an assignment approval clause
is to be treated as an absolute, unqualified prohibition of assignment giving a
landlord the right to withhold consent for any or for no reason."o Even an
arbitrary and capricious refusal of consent is usually deemed legitimate. Re-
statement section 15.2(2), however, rejects this position and imposes on the
landlord an implied duty to act with objective reasonableness. An examina-
tion of the cases purportedly supporting the Restatement position indicates,
however, that there is considerable confusion of the two related issues of a
landlord's right to withhold consent to transfer and a landlord's duty to miti-
gate damages. Although the assignment issue is of independent significance,
it has been the subject of little meaningful independent analysis.
In interpreting a lease, the overriding concern should be the intent of the
parties. When a particular meaning is commonly attributed to standard form
book language, use of this standard language should establish that meaning
as the expressed intent of the parties. In the contemporary transaction, giv-
ing a new construction to the long established meaning by imposing a duty
of good faith upon the parties to the transaction is appropriate and even
desirable. This good faith requirement eliminates a landlord's ability to with-
hold consent in an arbitrary and capricious manner, while honest personal
reasons continue to serve as justification for a denial of consent. Our chang-
ing perceptions of the rights and abilities of private individuals to agree to
binding obligations justifies the imposition of a subjective standard of good
faith in dealings between landlords and tenants. The objective standard
advocated in the Restatement, however, exceeds any such justification and
serves to change the fundamentals of the actual bargain. A change in the
interpretation of commonly used language of the magnitude suggested by
the Restatement's standard is therefore best accomplished through prospec-
tive legislation, of which there has been a considerable amount with respect
to the residential lease.'' Changing a deeply entrenched interpretation of
commonly used language by judicial fiat disregards the realities of the bar-
gain and can work an unnecessary hardship.
The greatest injustice caused by the adoption of the Restatement rule will
fall upon those to whom the rule is retroactively applied; also affected will
by tenants and their lawyers as securing the right to assign to a financially able transferee.
There is some authority contrary to the above quoted Restatement position. See, e.g., Sarner v.
Kantor, 123 Misc. 469, 205 N.Y.S. 760 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
160. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
161. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975) (setting forth a detailed rule of assignment and
consent); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-63 (repl. 1976) (lessor may not require payment of any
money for his consent except a service charge, nor withhold such consent unreasonably-
applicable only to long-term leases of residential lots); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (general
circumstances), § 236 (assignment of lease of deceased tenant) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1980).
See also MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403 (Tent. Draft 1969). Delaware
has provided a statutory rule applicable to residential, commercial and farm leases. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 5512 (1975). See appendix.
142 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:109
be those who do not take immediate note of this changing area of the law.
The lease specialist who does take note will attempt to secure the desired
bargain in future transactions by rewording the approval clause in order to
indicate clearly that the lease gives the landlord an absolute right to with-
hold consent. If the courts adopt the rule of section 15.2(2), however, there
will be a period of uncertainty regarding the precise choice of language re-
quired to effectuate this intention. Further, skepticism and doubt is likely
concerning whether the "established meaning" of any such new combination
of words will continue to be honored throughout the full term of any lease
then in effect.
Ironically, Restatement section 15.2(2) may be a self-fulfilling prophesy.
The Restatement, depending upon the alleged but unproved uncertainty of
the assignment approval clause for its new interpretation of that clause, has
by its new interpretation injected just such heretofore nonexistent uncer-
tainty into the clause's meaning. In short, the restatement has made the
assignment approval clause suddenly ambiguous and it is this ambiguity
which may ultimately justify the Restatement's construction of the approval
clause.
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APPENDIX
Although in a majority of states the landlord's right to withhold consent to
assignment is determined by case law and the Restatement may influence
courts in deciding which assignment rule to apply, a number of states have
addressed the matter by statute. In these states, however, with the excep-
tion of Delaware, the statutes apply only to residential leases. These statutes
typically propound a detailed formula for distinguishing reasonable from un-
reasonable withholding of consent. The statutes of Alaska and New York are
representative of these recently enacted statutes and are set forth below.
Delaware's statute, also set forth below, is of interest because it applies to
leases of residential, commercial and farm property.
ALAsKA STAT. § 34.03.060 (1975). This provision sets forth a detailed rule
regarding the matter of assignment and consent:
Sublease and assignment. (a) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the
tenant may not sublet his premises or assign the rental agreement to another
without the landlord's consent.
(b) The tenant's right to sublease his premises or assign the rental agree-
ment to another shall be conditioned on obtaining the landlord's consent,
which may be withheld only upon the grounds specified in (d) of this sec-
tion; no further restrictions on sublease or assignment are enforceable.
(c) When the rental agreement requires the landlord's consent for sublease
or assignment, the tenant may secure one or more persons who are willing
to occupy the premises. Each prospective occupant shall make a written
offer signed and delivered by him to the landlord, containing the following
information on the prospective occupant:
(1) name, age and present address;
(2) marital status;
(3) occupation, place of employment, and name and address of employer;
(4) number of all other persons who would normally reside with the
prospective occupant;
(5) two credit references, or responsible persons who will confirm the
financial responsibility of the prospective occupant; and
(6) names and addresses of all landlords of the prospective occupant dur-
ing the prior three years.
(d) Within 14 days after the written offer has been delivered to the land-
lord, the landlord may refuse consent to a sublease or assignment by a writ-
ten rejection signed and delivered by him to the tenant containing one or
more of the following reasonable grounds for rejecting the prospective occu-
pant:
(1) insufficient credit standing or financial responsibility;
(2) number of persons in the household;
(3) number of persons under 18 years of age in the household;
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(4) unwillingness of the prospective occupant to assume the same terms as
are included in the existing rental agreement;
(5) proposed maintenance of pets;
(6) proposed commercial activity; or
(7) written information signed by a previous landlord, which shall accom-
pany the rejection, setting out abuses of other premises occupied by the
prospective occupant.
(e) In the event the written rejection fails to contain one or more grounds
permitted by (d) of this section for rejecting the prospective occupant, the
tenant may consider the landlord's consent given or at his option may ter-
minate the rental agreement by a written notice given without unnecessary
delay to the landlord at least 30 days before the termination date specified in
the notice.
(f) If the landlord does not deliver a written rejection signed by him to
the tenant within 14 days after a written offer has been delivered to him by
the tenant, the landlord's consent to the sublease or assignment shall be
conclusively presumed.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25 § 5512 (1975). Delaware has provided a statutory
rule applicable to residential, commercial and farm leases.
Sublease and Assignments.
(a) Unless otherwise agreed in writing, the tenant may sublet his premises
or assign the rental agreement to another.
(b) The rental agreement may restrict the tenant's right to assign the
rental agreement in any manner. The tenant's right to sublease the premises
may be conditioned on obtaining the landlord's consent, which shall not be
unreasonably withheld. No consideration of race, creed, sex, marital status,
religion, political opinion or affiliation or national origin may be relied on by
the landlord as reasonable grounds for rejection. The fact that the tenant is a
welfare recipient shall not be grounds for rejection. In any proceeding in
which the reasonableness of the landlord as rejection shall be in issue, the
burden of showing reasonableness shall be on the landlord.
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 226-b (McKinney Supp. 1980). Although New
York has provided special rules for different assignment problems, it has also
enacted a general statutory rule.
Right to sublease or assign.
1. A tenant renting a residence in a dwelling having four or more residen-
tial units shall have the right to sublease or assign his premises, subject to
the written consent of the landlord given in advance of the sublease or
assignment. Such consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. If the land-
lord unreasonably withholds consent for such sublease or assignment, the
landlord must release the tenant from the lease upon request of the tenant.
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2. The tenant shall inform the landlord of his intent to sublease or assign
by mailing a notice of such intent by registered or certified mail. Such re-
quest shall be accompanied by the written consent thereto of any co-tenant
or guarantor of such lease and a statement of the name, business and home
address of the proposed sublessee or assignee. Within ten days after the
mailing of such request, the landlord may ask the sender thereof for addi-
tional information as will enable the landlord to determine if rejection of
such request shall be unreasonable. Within thirty days after the mailing of
the request for consent, or of the additional information reasonably asked for
by the landlord, whichever is later, the landlord shall send a notice to the
sender thereof of his consent or, if he does not consent, his reasons there-
fore. Landlord's failure to send such a notice shall be deemed to be a con-
sent to the proposed subletting or assignment. If the landlord consents, the
premises may be sublet or assigned in accordance with the request, but the
tenant thereunder, shall nevertheless remain liable for the performance of
tenant's obligations under said lease.
3. The provisions of this section shall not apply to leases entered into or
renewed before the effective date of this section, nor to public housing and
other units for which there are constitutional or statutory criteria covering
admission thereto nor to a proprietary lease, viz.: a lease to, or held by, a
tenant entitled thereto by reason of ownership of stock in a corporate owner
of premises which operates the same on a cooperative basis.

